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A STRUCTURALIST APPROACH TO THE
TWO STATE ACTION DOCTRINES
Justin Desautels-Stein*
ABSTRACT: By all accounts, the constitutional and antitrust state-
action doctrines are strangers. Courts and scholars see the constitu-
tional state-action doctrine as about the applicability of constitu-
tional rights in private disputes, and the antitrust state-action doc-
trine as a judicial negotiation between the scope of the Sherman Act
and the demands of federalism. In this conventional view, the only
thing the doctrines share in common is that they are both an awful
mess. This Article challenges the conventional wisdom and argues
that the two state-action doctrines are fundamentally connected,
and when viewed in a certain light, not even that messy. It is not
that the traditional readings of the two doctrines have been wrong,
so much as they persistently fail to take notice of the political theory
that threads the two doctrines together. That theory is liberal legal-
ism, and in the context of liberalism the two state-action doctrines
*Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. I received helpful com-
ments from Kyle Blackmer, Hal Bruff, Vic Fleischer, Erik Gerding, Helen Norton, Jeff
Pojanowski, Pierre Schlag, Jack Schlegel, Mark Tushnet, Spencer Weber Waller, and
participants at The University of Wisconsin School of Law's Classcrits IV conference.
Thanks to Shannon Avery Rollert, Jena Akin, and Steve Young for excellent research
assistance. This Article is part of a project exploring the contemporary relevance of
liberal legalism, and it is intended as a direct follow-up to my The Market as a Legal
Concept, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 387 (2012).
State Action Doctrine
bear witness to a story about American "competition law" that is
only half-told in the conventional fields of law and economics. To
better understand the legal foundations of market society, as well as
the requisites of market reform, we need something other than an
"economic analysis of law," much less a singular focus on various
forms of economic regulation. What is needed instead is an image
of the structure of market society, and an understanding of the deep
premises that make that image possible. In the service of that goal
this Article maps the manner in which these underground notions
inform the background rules of the market through the use of the
constitutional state-action doctrine, and simultaneously manage the
market through the use of regulatory devices like antitrust law.
These are the premises of our liberal legalism, and a fruitful field of
their study lies in the surprising connection between the two state-
action doctrines.
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INTRODUCrION
In the conventional view, there are two state-action doctrines in
American law. In constitutional law, the state-action doctrine is un-
derstood to police the boundary between governmental coercion of
private individuals on the one hand, and market transactions be-
tween individuals, which are governed by private law, on the other.
Constitutional state-action doctrine ("CSAD") teaches that where
the Constitution regulates the first type of coercion, the latter be-
havior is typically beyond the reach of constitutional law.' The anti-
'For a sampling of work on constitutional state action doctrine, see, e.g., David
Barron, Privatizing the Constitution: State Action and Beyond in The Rehnquist Leg-
acy (2006); Larry Alexander & Paul Horton, Whom Does the Constitution Com-
mand? A Conceptual Analysis with Practical Implications (1988); Lawrence A. Alex-
ander, Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action and Self-Help Repossession, 2 Hastings
Const. L.Q. 893 (1975); Charles Black, Foreword: State Action, Equal Protection, and
California's Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69, 95 (1967); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethink-
ing State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503 (1985), Harold Horowitz, The Misleading Search
for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 Cal. L. Rev. 208 (1957); Wilson
Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic Choice, 34 Hofstra L.
Rev. 1379 (2006); Alan R. Madry, State Action and the Due Process of Self-Help; Flagg
State Action Doctrine
trust state-action doctrine ("ASAD"), in contrast, has the purpose of
providing state actors with immunity when they engage in anti-
competitive acts that would otherwise violate U.S. antitrust law.
Unlike the broader sense about the applicability of constitutional
state-action doctrine to various state actors, immunity from anti-
trust enforcement will attach to a state actor only when the gov-
ernment has "clearly articulated" and "actively supervised" the an-
ticompetitive policy in question.
2
This Article argues for a way of seeing the two state action doc-
trines as similarly shaped by an underlying legal structure. 3 In a
Bros. Redux, 61 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (2000); David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government
Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 53 (1989); William W. Van Alstyne,
Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of State Action, 1965 Duke L.J.
214; Michael L. Wells, Identifying State Actors in Constitutional Litigation: Reviving the
Role ofSubstantive Context, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 99 (2004); Jerre S. Williams, The Twi-
light of State Action, 41 Tex. L. Rev. 347 (1963).
2 James Cooper & William Kovacic, U.S. Convergence with International Competition
Norms: Antitrust and Public Restraints on Competition, 90 B.U. L REV. 1555, 1575 (2010).
For work on antitrust state action doctrine see generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Anti-
trust and the Economics ofFederalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23 (1983); Andrew I. Gavil, Re-
constructing the Jurisdictional Foundation ofAntitrust Federalism, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
658 (1993); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-
Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory
Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203 (1997); Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State
Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential Economic Federalism, 75 CAL. L. REV. 227, 229
n.16 (1987) ;William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Recon-
struction and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L.
REV. 1099, 1109 (1981); John Shepard Wiley Jr., Revision and Apology in Antitrust Fed-
eralism, 96 YALE L.J. 1277, 1280 (1987); Jean Wegman Burns, Embracing Both Faces of
Antitrust Federalism: Parker and ARC America Corp., 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 29 (2000) (ex-
pressing approval for current doctrine because it permits experimentation in eco-
nomic regulation); Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency
and the Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486 (1987); D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompeti-
tive Government Interventions That Benefit Special Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119
(2009).
3 Though I haven't found any structuralist accounts of state action doctrine, there
are good examples of legal scholarship bringing an economic perspective to the con-
stitutional state-action doctrine. See, e.g., Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A
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long-standing and staggering amount of literature on the constitu-
tional and antitrust state-action doctrines (quite separate literatures,
mind you), structuralism is wholly absent. Given this lack of prior
analysis, it is tempting to figure that the doctrines really have noth-
ing to do with each other, and that if they did, someone would have
said so by now. After all, having the same last name does not mean
we are related.
Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PENN. L. REV. 1296 (1982); Frank I.
Michelman, The Bill of Rights, the Common Law, and the Freedom-Friendly State, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 401 (2004); Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of
Freedom, 92 GEO. L.J. 779, 779 (2004); Mark V. Tushnet, State Action, Social Welfare
Rights, and the Judicial Role: Some Comparative Observations, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 435 (2002).
However, my references to structuralism are not synonymous with legal realism or
Neo-Marxist approaches to law. This Article relies on a theory of legal structuralism
borrowed from the work of Roland Barthes, "The Structuralist Activity" in
STRUCTURALISM AND SINCE: FROM LEVI-STRAUSS TO DERRIDA (John Sturrock, ed.,
1979); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DISCOURSE ON
LANGUAGE (1969); HAYDEN WHITE, METAHISTORY: THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY EUROPE (1973); JONATHAN CULLER, STRUCTURALIST POETICS
(1975). Varying precedents in law include Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Black-
stone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979); Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Con-
cept, 93 HAR. L. REV. 1059 (1980); Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42
SYRACUSE L. REV. 75 (1991); David Kennedy, Theses About International Law Discourse,
23 GERMAN YEARBOOK INT'L L. 353 (1980); David Kennedy, Critical Theory, Structural-
ism, and Contemporary Legal Scholarship, 21 NEW ENGLAND. L. REV. 209 (1986); Gary
Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law; 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1151 (1985); Pierre Schlag, The
Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (2002). These works represent
contrasting moments in the history of legal structuralism, and they shouldn't be
confused for a precise rendering of the structuralist style at work in this article. In my
view, legal structuralism is anti-representational in a Rortian sense, and as a conse-
quence, far removed from "objective" accounts of "universal totalities." I don't be-
lieve that the early instances of legal structuralism were really after totalities, either,
though its critics certainly did. For Rorty's account of anti-representationalism, see
RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979). For the poststruc-
turalist critique of the first wave of legal structuralism, see James Boyle, The Politics of
Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985). For
a general discussion and argument in favor of a "second generation" of legal struc-
turalism, see Justin Desautels-Stein, The Rise and Fall of Legal Structuralism (manu-
script on file with the New York University Journal of Law & Liberty).
State Action Doctrine
Nevertheless, if we ignore the pull of tradition and push for-
ward with a thesis about a structural relation between the two state-
action doctrines, we are confronted with more than the broad com-
mon sense among constitutional and antitrust lawyers that the doc-
trines are alien to one another. As scholars of constitutional and an-
titrust law have occasionally argued with more precision, there are
at least three other arguments poised against a structural approach
to state action:
(1) One of these arguments is political. When the state action
problem attended by antitrust lawyers first emerged in the 1940s,
the constitutional version was already in the midst of a full-on mid-
life crisis. It was at this time, in the heady years building up to
Brown v. Board of Education,4 that the constitutional state-action doc-
trine was wrestling with the constitutionality of racially restrictive
covenants on the transfer of property. 5 In contrast, the antitrust
state-action doctrine was hatched in 1943 as a technical answer to a
question about the political economy of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
6
The topic of the controversy was the price of raisins.
This is simply to say that the two doctrines are of different ages
and sensibilities, have matured in the hands of very different gener-
ations of lawyers, and seem laden with very different sorts of politi-
cal stakes. The constitutional state-action doctrine is a sexy, famous
train wreck, "a conceptual disaster area" 7 that has lured in some of
the greatest legal minds of the twentieth century. Antitrust state-
action doctrine, in contrast, is hardly famous at all. Cloaked in the
homely language of efficiency and expertise, antitrust plays the
marginal supplement to the other, more self-important doctrine,
teeming over with pomp and nonsense. Perhaps most importantly,
4 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
6 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
' Black, supra note 1, at 95.
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the two doctrines also appear to be trained on very different targets.
The one is about the deployment of a supreme power in the name
of individual rights, while the other is about the inviolability of free
markets. As Herbert Hovenkamp, an impressive scholar of both
constitutional and antitrust law, has explained, "the two are rarely
confused."
8
(2) For many antitrust scholars, a second issue that might im-
plicitly distinguish antitrust state-action doctrine from constitution-
al state-action doctrine is federalism.9 As James Cooper and William
Kovacic have recently re-stated the idea, "[a]t its core, the [antitrust]
state action doctrine is about federalism. It attempts to resolve the
extent to which a state, in a system of dual sovereigns, can pursue
policies that conflict with the national policy in favor of competi-
tion."10 In a slightly more jaundiced view, Richard Squire has ar-
gued that while federalism is indeed the animating basis of antitrust
state-action doctrine, it is a basis that is deeply confused. 1 Squire's
argument turns on the distinction between state actors (performing
as market participants) that have violated federal antitrust law, and
state actors (performing as lawmakers) that have violated federal
antitrust law.12 In the first type of case, Squire believes that state-
action immunity might make sense,13 but that in the latter cases,
courts have habitually failed to see that these cases are governed by
the Constitution's Supremacy Clause-if the question is simply
whether state law should trump federal law, well, we know the an-
'Herbert Hovenkamp, Federalism and Antitrust Reform, 40 U.S.F. L. REv. 627, 628 n.
15 (2006).
9 See generally Daniel Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CAL. L. REv. 1, 3 (2008).
'0 Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 2, at 1568.
" See generally Richard Squire, Antitrust and the Supremacy Clause, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 77 (2006).
12 Id. at 80-93.
'" Id. at 85-87.
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swer. 14 Consequently, Squire seemingly agrees with the majority
view about antitrust state action doctrine being a doctrine of feder-
alism. He just thinks it is a terrible mess.15 The upshot: if antitrust
state-action doctrine is all about federalism, we know that federal-
ism is surely not the core of constitutional state-action doctrine,
which has as its raison d'tre the protection of individual rights.
16
(3) A third ostensible basis for separating out the doctrines
turns on the apparently very different problems they are under-
stood to be addressing, as opposed to apparent differences in their
conceptual cores. Writing more than twenty years ago, and in one
of the few articles that explicitly talks of the two doctrines together,
Einer Elhague argued that what was "really driv[ing]" decisions
about the scope of antitrust review in state-action cases was a de-
termination of whether private parties with financial interests in
restraining trade were behind the regulations at issue. 17 Because of
his advocacy of a process-oriented view of the interests at stake, it is
easy to see Elhague as performing a kind of post-realist attack on
formalistic theories of state action, hoping to do to antitrust law
what Brainerd Currie did to conflict of laws.' 8 The process view of
financial interest, and the possibility of regulatory capture in eco-
nomic decision-making, Elhague explained, proved to be a very
"4 Id. at 78-79.
15 Id.
16 Interestingly, the very early cases dealing with constitutional state action doc-
trine were precisely about federalism. For the Court, the initial questions involved
the relation between the Fourteenth Amendment and the state police power. See, e.g.,
Mark Tushnet, State Action in 2020, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, 73 (Jack Balkin &
Reva Siegel, eds.) (2009) ("At its origin, the state-action doctrine was a federalism
doctrine.").
"7 Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REv. 667, 683,
691 (1991).
18 For an interesting spin on the familiar story, see Annelise Riles, A New Agenda
for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973, 1009-18
(2005).
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different playing field than that of constitutional law. Apparently
in the constitutional context, worries of another sort were in play.19
Looking for support from a footnote in NCAA v. Tarkanian, 20
Elhague emphasized how questions of "what constitutes state ac-
tion under antitrust law are 'by no means identical' with its conclu-
sions about 'state action' under constitutional law." 21 Very likely
seeing that Justice Stevens was actually implying more of a similari-
ty than a real difference between the doctrines, Elhague went on to
chide the Court for "understat[ing] the degree of inconsistency."
22
A decade later, and from what Elhague would likely criticize as
precisely the kind of formalism he was out to wipe away, Steven
Semeraro suggested that the two state-action doctrines are irrele-
vant to one another due to their very different senses about the na-
ture of the infamous public-private distinction. 23 Thus, where
Elhague critiqued the public-private distinction wholesale,
Semeraro defended the coherence of a public-private distinction in
the special context of antitrust law.24 According to Semeraro, the
state does not perform in the traditionally "public" role of the coer-
cive regulator known to constitutional law when it is merely facili-
tating free competition in the marketplace. Thus, "state action" in
the context of antitrust law is apparently very different from state
9 Wiley had made a similar argument a few years before. See John Shepard Wiley,
Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1986).2 0 NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179,194 n.14 (1988) ("Although by no means iden-
tical, analysis of the existence of state action justifying immunity from antitrust liabil-
ity is somewhat similar to the state action inquiry conducted pursuant to § 1983 and
the Fourteenth Amendment. In both contexts, for example, courts examine whether
the rule in question is a rule of the State.").
2 Elhauge, supra note 17, at 682.
22 Id.
23 Steven Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State Action Doctrine, 24 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 203, 269 (2000).
24 Id. at 266-72.
State Action Doctrine
action in constitutional law, since state action in the former is "al-
truistic," while state action in the latter is "coercive." 25
So there we have some of the initial worries from scholars like
Hovenkamp, Cooper, Kovacic, Squire, Elhague, and Semeraro
about seeing the two state-action doctrines as manifestations of a
single legal style. There is the argument from tradition, which in-
structs us to see that a connection between the two doctrines is like-
ly false since there have been few attempts to find such a connec-
tion. There is the argument from political history, teaching us about
the very different circumstances and normative foundations of the
doctrines. There is the argument about the contrasting conceptual
cores of the two doctrines, in which antitrust state-action doctrine
deals with the problem of federalism -a problem absent from con-
stitutional state-action doctrine. Last, there is the argument about
the relation between the state and the market, in which we see how
the market and state play fundamentally different roles in the two
doctrines.
This Article argues that these explanations and intuitions have
either misconstrued or just missed the "bigger" picture. Indeed,
when seen through the lens of legal structuralism, four significant
insights about the relationship between the constitutional and anti-
trust state-action doctrines come into view:
(1) The apparently incoherent fields of state action begin to co-
here quite sensibly when analyzed together. If the two state-action
doctrines are often understood as demonstrably incoherent on their
own, the present argument suggests that our understanding of the
state action doctrines will be considerably deepened if we under-
stand them as "utterances" of a single language-system.
(2) Another involves a novel understanding of the public-
private distinction seemingly indigenous to both of the state-action
25 Id. at 270.
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doctrines. In the wide literature on the public-private distinction,
26
the understanding is that a court's heavy reliance on a sharp dis-
tinction between the public and private spheres of government and
society will lead it into an increasingly small domain of state action.
And to be sure, this is precisely how the public-private distinction
performs in the context of CSAD. The traditional conclusion is that
a court's strong reliance on a public-private distinction will lead to
politically "conservative" results. As argued below, in what is likely
the most immediately striking aspect of a structuralist account of
state action, the ASAD flips the traditional politics of the public-
private distinction: in this context, courts often use a strong public-
private distinction to generate "liberal" results, and rely on a weak
distinction to generate "conservative" ones. The ultimate take-away
here is that the public-private distinction does not actually have
any pre-loaded political valence.
(3) An understanding of the relatedness of questions about con-
stitutional and competition law inoculates us from the traditional
story of the rise and fall of "Lochnerian" substantive due process.
27
In that old story, we are meant to remember how constitutional in-
terpretation once engaged in a dangerous and unsavory affair with
economic rights-an affair that thankfully came to an end before
World War II. A singular focus on Lochner, however, blinds consti-
tutional scholars to the much more basic and foundational econom-
ic role that the constitution plays in the construction of market soci-
26 See, e.g., JOHN DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF LAW (1968); Karl Klare, The Pub-
ic/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358 (1982); John Merryman, The
Public Law-Private Law Distinction in European and American Law, 17 J. PUB. L. 3 (1968);
Francis Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Market Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); Roscoe Pound, Public Law and Private Law, 24 CORNELL L.
Q. 469 (1939).
27 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For a recent attempt to defend Lochner,
see DAVID BERNSTEN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011).
State Action Doctrine
ety. Seeing the constitutional state action doctrine as of apiece with
the antitrust state action doctrine pushes the Lochner story to the
side, and instead emphasizes an economic role for the constitution
that it still plays today.
(4) Finally, and perhaps most practically, a structuralist account
of state action suggests a unified story about the nature of competi-
tion law in the United States-a story that is only half-told, at best,
when the focus is only on antitrust law. The practical or operational
aspect of this insight comes into focus once we take notice of the
constant calls for market reform, which seem to be only increasing
over time.28 If scholars, pundits, and politicians are serious about
the desirability of a major shift in the way in which we have struc-
tured our market society, it is absolutely essential that we train our
sights not only on the regulatory apparatus that is meant to control
and restrain market forces, but also on the background rules that
presuppose the very existence of those "forces." Without due atten-
tion to the background rules of a competitive market, our hopes for
reform will always be piecemeal. 29 A study of the alliance between
28 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y, TIMES (Sept.
6, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2OO9/O9/06/magazine/06; Llewellyn
H. Rockwell, Jr., What is Fascism?, THE FREE MARKET, available at
http://mises.org/journals/fm/FMFall_2011.pdf; L. Randall Wray, Let's Make a
Deal: The Bail-Out of Wall Street in Unusual and Exigent Circumstances, HUFFINGTON
POST (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/1-randall-wray/lets-make-a-
deal-the- bail b 1283007 .html; James A. Kahn, Can We Determine the Optimal Size of
Government?, in CENTER FOR GLOBAL LIBERTY & PROSPERITY DEVELOPMENT POLICY
BRIEFING PAPER No. 7 (Sept. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.cato.org/publications/development-briefing-paper/can-we-
determine-optimal-size-government.
29 See generally, Justin Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal Concept, 60 BUFF. L.
REV. 387, 395-396 (2012); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS
(2011). This point walks a very slippery slope. The intention in this article is to pro-
duce a "style" of state action. In that sense, it is not meant to track the "real world" in
an empirical, representational way, Indeed, the article's conceptual apparatus rejects
the theory of representationalism. This triggers the question, however, why it is that
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the two state-action doctrines helps us see these two dimensions of
competition law, and their deep connectedness.
In the discussion that follows, Part I surveys the "conceptual
lens" that makes it possible to properly see the two state-action doc-
trines as a unity: liberal legalism. 30 It is argued that liberal legalism
presents us with an image of market society, an image that is both
constituted and regulated by law. In the aesthetic of liberal legal-
ism, market society is constituted by the private law rules of proper-
ty and contract, as interpreted by constitutional law, and regulated
by a public law of which antitrust law is a canonical example. I refer
to these constitutive rules of the market as "background rules," and
the regulatory rules as "foreground rules." Part II explores constitu-
tional state action doctrine through the lens of liberal legalism and
the liberal dichotomy between background and foreground rules,
and Part III does the same with antitrust state action doctrine. Part
IV concludes, summarizing the deep alliance between the two state
action doctrines.
that an appreciation of the liberal style which is the object of study should be of any
value. Following Barthes, my thinking here is that while it is a mistake to think of the
structure of state action doctrine as a faithful representation of the "actual" legal
universe, my presentation is still "interested" in the world. "We see, then, why we
must speak of a structuralist activity: creation or reflection are not, here, an original
'impression' of the world, but a veritable fabrication of a world that resembles the
first one, not in order to copy it but to render it intelligible. Hence one might say that
structuralism is an activity of imitation, which is also why there is, strictly speaking,
no technical difference between structuralism as an intellectual activity on the one
hand and literature in particular, or art in general on the other: both derive from a
mimesis..." Barthes, supra note, at 150.
30 This term comes with a lot of baggage. All I intend to mean by it is the view of
law espoused by liberal political theory. Among the best expressions of the idea is
found in ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975). To the extent that liber-
alism has many different views of law, then this simply suggests that liberal legalism
has several faces. In my view, it has three of them: classic, modem, and pragmatic.
See Justin Desautels-Stein, Pragmatic Liberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. __ (forth-
coming 2014).
State Action Doctrine
I. LIBERAL COMPETITION LAW
A. LIBERAL LEGALISM AND THE MARKET AS A LEGAL CONCEPT
In liberal political theory, markets are constituted and regulated
through law. 31 Depending on the particular style of liberalism we
are addressing, we might emphasize those rules that are doing the
constitutive work in the background, or instead prefer the regulat-
ing rules that are in the foreground. Traditional examples of these
sorts of background rules are those rules we associate with the pri-
vate law of Anglo-American legal thought, such as property and
contract law.32 Examples of foreground rules include statutory re-
gimes, such as a federal labor law, tax law, environmental or anti-
trust law.
33
The key point to see at this stage, however, is that liberalism
begins its portrait of market society with a legal medium. For mar-
kets to happen at all, they have to be legalized. The question that
follows: if liberalism sees markets as legal concepts, what are the
"J See, e.g., Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Law in Modem Society (1976); Roberto
Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become? (Verso 1996); Duncan Kennedy, Sexy
Dressing etc. (1995); John Henry Schlegel, On the Many Flavors of Capitalism, or Reflec-
tions on Schumpeter's Ghost, 56 Buff. L. Rev. 965 (2008); David Trubek, Max Weber on
Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 720 (1972); David Trubek, Toward a
Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development, 82 Yale L.J. 1
(1972); David Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36
Stan. L. Rev. 575 (1984); David Trubek & Mark Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement:
Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974
Wis. L. Rev. 1062 (1974).
32 See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Skepticism and Freedom: A Modem Case for Classic
Liberalism (2003); Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Tri-
umphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (2000); Richard Posner, Creating a Legal
Framework for Economic Development, in The World Bank, Research Observer (Feb.
1998), available at siteresources.worldbank.org/ .../Resources/LegalFramework.pdf;
33 For great coverage of the world of regulation, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER
DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 175 (2008). A classic discussion is Charles
Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L. J. 1227 (1966).
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relevant rules? In order to answer that question, we need to first
choose a style of liberal legalism.
In the classic liberal style, the central requirement is the legali-
zation of those rights classically understood to fill out a theory of
individual will. 34 To take John Locke as a canonical illustrator of the
style, the idea is to build an idea of free competition among auton-
omous market actors on the foundation of property and contract
law. 35 For Locke, the chief purpose of constitutional government
34 See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT
(2006).
35 With particular reference to Locke's Second Treatise, we see an image of com-
petitive society populated by individuals who possess inalienable and fundamental
rights. Among the key classic texts are DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Eric Steinberg ed., 2nd ed. 1993); JOHN LOCKE, THE
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETFER CONCERNING TOLERATION 12 (Paul
Negri & Tom Crawford eds., Dover Publications 2002) (1689); JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY (Paul Negri & Kathy Casey, eds., Dover Thrift Editions 2002); see generally
JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (W. J. Ashley ed. 1923) (1848);
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (1776) . For historical treatments, see ROBERT HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY
PHILOSOPHERS (Simon & Schuster eds., 7th ed. 1995); JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, A HISTORY
OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1954); JACOB VINER, ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
OF ECONOMICS (Douglas A. Irwin, ed. 1991); LIONEL ROBBINS, A HISTORY OF
ECONOMIC THOUGHT (Steven G. Medama & Warren J. Samuels eds., 1998); BERTRAND
RUSSEL, THE HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY (1945). Most importantly, these rights
include the right to own property and freely contract with others -rights which to-
gether form the liberal idea of liberty. LOCKE, supra note 35, at Chapter 5. In terms of
"contract" representing a liberal progression from the feudal notion of "status," Hen-
ry Sumner Maine is likely the argument's most well-known advocate. HENRY
SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF
SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 304 (4th ed. 1870). As he argued:
"There are few general propositions concerning the age to which we belong which
seem at first sight likely to be received with readier concurrence than the assertion
that the society of our day is mainly distinguished from that of preceding genera-
tions by the largeness of the sphere which is occupied in it by Contract... Not many
of us are so unobservant as not to perceive that in innumerable cases where old law
fixed a man's social position irreversibly at his birth, modem law allow him to create
for himself by convention..." Id. In order to first establish the requisite elements of
this competitive society, and then to effectively maintain them, this natural law must
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was to secure the freedom of these background rights.36 Thus, Locke
understood the most important role of constitutional law to be the
insulation of property and contract rights from political interfer-
ence. Of course, liberal theory would shift over the ensuing centu-
ries, and constitutional law would be variously interpreted as hav-
ing very different sorts of purposes. 37 In line with the broadening
of this constitutional vision also developed alternative ways of
thinking about market society, including the idea that markets re-
quired a great deal more than just the background rules of property
and contract in order for them to operate effectively and fairly.38
be off-set by the artificial creation of a political society. Thus, Locke establishes the
importance of law in actually making market society work. LOCKE, supra note 35, at
Chapter 5. Through the legalization of property and contract as background rules,
market society is enabled in a manner that it was not in the state of nature. Constitu-
tional law becomes important as a mechanism for protecting these background rules
from improper political manipulation.
36 Locke's "great and chief end", LOCKE, supra note 35, at 57, for establishing a
government and political society: "[Tlhe preservation of the property of all the
members of that society as far as is possible." Id. at 39. Indeed, Locke goes further, for
it is not simply that government has the protection of property as its key purpose,
but that political society cannot even exist "without having in itself the power to
preserve the property, and in order thereunto, punish the offenses of all those of that
society...." Id.
" For two versions of the story, see, e.g., LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW (2005); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992).
38 In the field of theories of capitalism, this shift is well-captured in the writings of
thinkers like PAUL BARAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH (1957); PAUL A.
BARAN & PAUL M. SWEEZY, MONOPOLY CAPITAL (Pelican Publ'g Co. 1966); JOHN
GAILBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER
(1993);ABBA LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL: PRINCIPLES OF WELFARE
ECONOMICS (1944). In politics, this is captured in the process of the New Deal estab-
lishment. See, e.g., DANIEL YERGIN AND JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING
HEIGHTS (1998). In law, legal realism probably embodies at least the critique of prop-
erty and contract rights, if not the embrace of the welfare state. For discussion, see
BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ-FAIRE (First Harvard Univ.
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Thus, in the modern liberal style, foreground rules came into vogue,
whereby the state was generally perceived as deserving more lee-
way in its discretion to regulate market activity.39
In the last decades of the twentieth century, modern liberalism
began to falter as a new, or neoliberal, view of the market came to
dominance. 40 The neoliberal image of the market has much in com-
Press 2001); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995).
'9 Desautels-Stein, supra note 31, at 421-42. Roberto Unger has described this ap-
proach in the following way: "First, its continuing commitment to the welfare state
and to investment in the people, as both an end in itself and a condition of economic
success; second, a desire to rid the regulated market economy of statist, corporatist,
and oligopolistic constraints upon economic flexibility and innovation, especially in
the transition to a postfordist style of industrial organization, accompanied by sym-
pathy toward bottom-up association and participation by people in local government
and social organization; and third, an unabashed institutional conservatism, ex-
pressed in skepticism about large projects of institutional reconstruction and in the
acceptance of the current legal forms of market economies, representative democra-
cies, and free civil societies." UNGER, supra note 32, at 10. Modern liberalism was just
as concerned with economic development as was its classic ancestor, but where the
classic style was preoccupied with how to establish a legal framework for market
society (just as is today's development practitioner), the modem liberal style was
created to deal with the consequences of the free competition model. The modern
style sought to keep "present institutional arrangements while controlling their con-
sequences: by counteracting, characteristically, through tax-and-transfer or through
preferment for disadvantaged groups, their distributive consequences." Id. Thus,
where the classic liberal image of the market involves a heavy reliance on back-
ground rules and almost no role for foreground rules, the modern liberal image of
law is very different. Here, markets are seen as not only being constituted by legal
rules, but as also requiring regulation and management through foreground rules.
Any number of writers might be volunteered as exemplars of the modem liberal
style, with Keynes as likely the first. What is interesting about modem liberalism,
however, is its agnosticism about so many things. The modern liberal image of the
market, and its preference for foreground rules over background rules, can be found
in the works of scholars so different as Henry Carter Adams and Frank Knight. See
Desautels-Stein, supra note 31, at 421-42.
0 For discussions, see DAVID HARVEY, NEOLIBERALISM: A SHORT HISTORY (2005);
DEEPAK LAL, REVIVING THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE CASE FOR CLASSICAL LIBERALISM IN
THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY (2006); THE ROAD FROM MONT PERELIN: THE MAKING OF
THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECrIVE (Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe eds. 2009);
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mon with the classic liberal style, and a chief illustrator is Friedrich
Hayek.41 For Hayek, the market took as a fundamental prerequisite
an idea about the "Rule of Law." 42 This concept, which he also re-
ferred to as "rules of just conduct," evolved over time because they
were successful -they beat out other rules or customs because they
made for better lives.4 3 But Hayek did not think that the elaborators
of these customs ever consciously promulgated them, or may have
even been able to articulate them. Customs were instead manifested
in the regularity of practice. "The important point is that every man
growing up in a given culture will find in himself rules, or may dis-
cover that he acts in accordance with rules-and will similarly rec-
ognize the actions of others as conforming or not conforming to var-
ious rules."44
What follows from this spontaneous and organic conception of
rules is the idea that they cannot be attributed to any conscious, de-
liberate, human design. 45 For Hayek, these rules of conduct are
therefore, by definition, "pre-political," just as in the same way that
the growth of organic compounds or the arrangements of magnetic
fields are wholly natural. 46 These customary rules form the core of
the neoliberal "Rule of Law."
DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATrLE FOR
THE WORLD ECONOMY (2008).
4 For an interesting discussion of Hayek that attempts to systematically situate
his thought against the work of Harold Laski and JM Keynes, see KENNETH HOOVER,
ECONOMICS AS IDEOLOGY (2003).
12 Hayek's vision of the Rule of Law is similar to but analytically distinct from
other, well-known arguments from the likes of AC Dicey and Lon Fuller. For a help-
ful map, see Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Uses of the 'Rule of Law' Promise in Eco-
nomic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL 253-300 (2006).
43 
FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 18 (1944).
4Id. at 19.4
1 Id. at 28.
46 Id. at 39-40.
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While the Rule of Law is the essence of the liberal legal order,
Hayek reminds us that where "foreground rules" are necessarily
distributive, the Rule of Law (or what I am calling "background
rules") is "independent of purpose," blindly and equally applicable
to all. 47 Real freedom, as a result, is therefore conditioned on a
choice of background rules (the Rule of Law) over foreground rules
(legislation), where the Rule of Law is understood as permissive
and enabling, and legislation is prohibitive and coercive.
Hayek helpfully concludes that everything he has discussed
with regard to the rules of conduct operating in the spontaneous
order, and the willy-nilly legislative caprice of governmental organ-
ization, tracks exactly the distinction between private and public
law, respectively. 48 Also, and again, Hayek says that with regard to
constitutional law, its fame has been misconceived. Its job is simply
to "secure the maintenance of the law," 49 by which he means the
common law of property and contract.5 0
471 d. at 50.
41 Id. at 132.
19 Id. at 134.
" Roberto Unger underlines the point as well, when he explains that as a first way
of protecting the liberal principles of property and contract, courts rely on interpre-
tive methods to shift rules that have tended towards distributive, non-neutral poli-
cies back towards the Rule of Law. When this is not enough, "the back-up policing
practice is constitutional invalidation, striking down those instances of redistribution
through law that cannot be preempted through improving interpretation UNGER,
supra note 32, at 42. Though Unger and Hayek have substantially similar descriptions
of the liberal Rule of Law, they part ways when it comes to its evaluation. For Hayek,
private law governance was the only way to guarantee a maximum of freedom and
equality. For Unger and other critics, the abandonment of social organization to the
private law is to acquiesce in persistent and entrenched hierarchies and stark ine-
qualities; is to embrace an institutional fetishism proclaiming the naturalness of one
set of legal, political, and economic arrangements; is to mask the political choices
embedded in the liberal style of property and contract law, and the benefits these
choices typically confer on the wealthy at the expense of the poor; is to indulge a
fantasy in which the judiciary's job of ascertaining the Rule of Law is any less subject
to political and moral capture than the legislature's job of rule creation; is to pretend
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Though Hayek imagined the private law as non-coercive and
pre-political in a very strong sense, he nevertheless did, like Locke
before him, believe that the market brought with it more than a sus-
tainable peace (essential as that was), but a just society as well. It
was not that either of them thought that the moral content of prop-
erty and contract would generate any particular constellation of
social outcomes, but rather that it was the process of the private law
that was just.51 "In this respect what has been correctly said of John
Locke's view on the justice of competition, namely, that 'it is the
way in which competition is carried on, not its results, that count,'
is generally true of the liberal conception of justice, and of what jus-
tice can achieve in a spontaneous order."
52
B. THE Two STATE ACTION DOCTRINES: A LIBERAL ALLIANCE
The styles of liberal legalism use two different kinds of rules to
make markets work. There are the background rules of the private
law, which are taken as abstract and foundational but with varying
degrees of importance in the three liberal styles, and the foreground
rules of legislation, which are emphasized in the modern style and
nearly absent in the classic and neoliberal styles. In all cases, the
liberal image of the market is defined by a distinction between pub-
lic and private, state and market. That is, the liberal theory of the
market depends on a concept of "state action" as distinguished
from private or "non-state" action.
The central argument in this Article is that, in liberalism, the
constitutional and antitrust state action doctrines are both generat-
that the courts are somehow less arms of the state than other government agencies.
Id.
51 For two, non-complementary views of the claim, see generally, ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1977) and MICHAEL SANDEL, THE LIMITS OF
LIBERALISM (1993).
52 HAYEK, supra note 44, at 38.
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ed and governed by the same deep structure, and that when viewed
together the two doctrines coalesce as part of a single theory of
"competition law."5 3 Insofar as liberal legalism instructs its adher-
ents on the matter of building a market society, the elementary rules
of the private law form the fundamentals of its law of competition.
In particular, liberal competition law begins with an abstract com-
mitment to property and contract. As a consequence, any compre-
hensive attempt to analyze liberal forms of competition law must
begin with an identification of the relevant background rules of the
private law. This is where competition law starts, and at least in the
classic liberal style, that is pretty much where it ends. The only real
additional factor is constitutional law, meant to serve as a guarantor
of the private law's autonomy.
In liberal legalism, CSAD is a field of law essentially concerned
with precisely these background rules -the first dimension of com-
petition law.54 It is a field of law wherein judges attempt to negoti-
ate liberalism's crucial divide between what counts as "market" and
what counts as "state." If the relevant act in a constitutional state
action dispute is determined to be an act in the market, the judge
will shield the defendant from constitutional challenge, and allow
the private law rules to coerce the result. If the relevant act is
deemed an act of "state," the plaintiff is granted constitutional
powers capable of trumping the background private rules upon
which the defendant had relied. As Gary Peller and Mark Tushnet
have similarly explained, the constitutional state action doctrine is
5'I should be careful to avoid any confusion here about the term "competition
law." As is well known, competition law is the preferred term in most of the rest of
the world for what we call in the United States "antitrust law." My argument here
has nothing to do with that terminological debate.
5' See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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essentially about "the distribution of the background rights of
property, contract, and tort."
55
ASAD concerns the very same issue-the liberal image of mar-
ket society. The major conceptual difference is that where constitu-
tional state action doctrine is focused on the role of the Constitution
in managing the rights of individual actors in the market, antitrust
state action doctrine is focused on the role of antitrust law in man-
aging the role of the state in its regulation of the market. Thus, where
CSAD deals with the proper constitutional scope of competition
among rights-holders, ASAD deals with the proper regulatory
scope of the state in its management of the competitive process.
Of course, the tests are different, the relevant statutes are differ-
ent, and so on. But the doctrines are united by their participation in
a shared language-system, or to borrow a term from semiotics, a
langue.56 The core issue in neither doctrine is federalism but is rather
the legal production and management of market society, and the
public-private distinction is the very same distinction at work in
constitutional state action jurisprudence. It functions differently, or if
you like, it is spoken differently, but in both doctrines the decisive
question is a question about the relation between "state" and "mar-
ket." The two state action doctrines are deeply connected as aspects
of a much broader project to constitute and regulate the liberal im-
age of the market. CSAD operates at the level of background rules
(the first dimension of liberal competition law), and the ASAD op-
erates at the level of foreground rules (the second dimension of lib-
eral competition law). When viewed through the lens of liberal le-
galism, the linguistic complementarity between the constitutional
and antitrust state action doctrines becomes apparent. Together, the
55 PELLER & TusHNET, supra note 2, at 779.
56 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 34. For an introduction to semiotics, see
FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, CouRsF IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (1998). See also JONATHAN
CULLER, FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE (Revised Edition, 1986).
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Figure 1: Liberal Competition Law
A further point to be made about a structural approach to the
two state action doctrines implicates our understanding of the pub-
lic-private distinction. As will be discussed, there is a tendency to
see the public-private distinction as tethered to a particular way of
thinking about left-right politics. Traditionally, the "politics of the
left" in constitutional law is associated with a weak public-private
distinction. But when we put the two state action doctrines togeth-
er, this association falters. Somewhat surprisingly, a "left" position
is serviced through the use of a strong version of the public-private
distinction in the context of the antitrust state action doctrine. These




CSAD Sharp Vague Sharp
ASAD N/A Sharp Vague
Figure 2: Public-Private Distinction
II. THE BACKGROUND RULES OF COMPETITION LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
Conventionally, the notion of "constitutional rights" conjures
the image of the injured individual, somehow harmed by the state
in what should have been her protected claims to speech, religion,
property, process, and the like. And indeed, much of modern state
action jurisprudence has this flavor.57 More important for present
purposes, however, is the manner in which judges have tended at
times to rule out constitutional claims when the operative restraints
came from the common law (or what might also be called Hayek's
Rule of Law.) That is, if a person claims that his individual rights
have been violated, the court's "state action" requirement may
threaten the enforcement of those rights if the violation in question
fails to involve a state act that is other than and totally distinct from
some rule of the common law.58 At least in the classic and neoliberal
57 For a recent canvass of the doctrine, see Developments in the Law- State Action
and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1248 (2010).
58 Courts have developed a number of tests for identifying the limits of "state ac-
tion." They include: the "Public Function Test," which requires a plaintiff to show
that the defendant has exercised a kind of power traditionally reserved to the state,
see Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); the "State Compulsion Test," which
requires the plaintiff to show that their behavior was compelled by the state, see
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); the "Nexus Test," which requires a sufficiently
close connection between the state and the challenged activity, see Jackson v. Metro.
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styles, judicial deployment of common law rules are not regarded
as acts of the state -the judiciary becomes a kind of "non-state ac-
tor."
On this view, "state action" becomes the sole province of the
legislature or executive, and acts that are somehow distinguishable
from pre-existing rules of common law. Consequently, a better
name for the classic liberal/neoliberal state action doctrine might
actually be "legislative action doctrine." Predictably, this way of in-
corporating the classic/ neoliberal style into the state action doctrine
has not monopolized the field. As modem liberalism and the wel-
fare state became dominant after WWII, the Supreme Court sig-
naled a shift in its dialect with Shelley v. Kramer.59 In this and other
state action decisions of the era, the Court's economics leaned to the
left, only to see a shift once again to the right in the late 1970s.
There is no shortage of scholarly commentary bemoaning the
awful mess that is the state action doctrine. 60 Some of it is in the
Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974); the "State Agency Test," which requires a showing that
the challenged action was under the control of a state agency, see Pa. v. Bd. of Dirs.,
353 U.S. 230 (1957); the "Entwinement Test," which requires obvious necessity, see
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001); the
"Joint Participation Test," which requires a private actor to have been "cloaked with
authority of the state," see United States v. Hoffman, 498 F.2d 879, 881 (7th Cir. 1974).
For discussions, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1706
(1988); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Consti-
tutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302, 317-321
(1995); Julie K. Brown, Less is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73 Mo. L.
REV. 561 (2008).
" 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
60 The fact that constitutional state action has been subject to decades of over-
whelming critique should not be surprising when its history is viewed in light of the
transition from classic to modem liberalism. In the modem style, the line between
state and market, public and private, has been intentionally blurred. Keeping the
line, but insuring its ambiguity is a defining trait of the welfare state. As such, of
course it will be difficult to assign ostensibly neutral rules the task of defining the
outlines of "state action." Thus, I make no attempt to "solve" the problem of state
action. One possibility of moving forward is the one suggested by Mark Tushnet:
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spirit of this Article, cataloguing early decisions as apiece with clas-
sical liberalism, mid-twentieth century decisions as an attack on
that liberal tradition, and others as a resurgent liberalism.61 Here,
the intent is to highlight the economic dimensions of constitutional
state action doctrine- the manner in which the use of constitutional
rules to inoculate property and contract rules shifts in the light of
the classic liberal style to modern liberalism, and then shifts again
to the neoliberal style. In every case, the point is that constitutional
state action doctrine encompasses a set of pivotal decisions about
the extent to which private law rules should be left to generate
market conditions. In the classic and neoliberal styles, private law
rules are believed to deserve a great deal of deference in their con-
stitution of the market, while in the modem liberal style, they re-
ceive less.
The bottom line is to demonstrate a structural view of US com-
petition law that takes its background rules into account -
background rules that can be studied in the context of constitutional
state action doctrine.
A. PRELUDE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The 1870s were a key moment in the grand stylistic shift from
classical to neoclassical economics (and from "political economy" to
abolish the state action doctrine. MARK TUSHNET, STATE ACTION IN 2020, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020 (Jack Balkin & Reva Siegel eds., 2010).
61 Recently members of the Harvard Law Review engaged in an exercise of this
type, working phases of the constitutional state action doctrine into Duncan Kenne-
dy's framework of the three globalizations. See HARV. L. REV., Developments in the
Law - State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1248 (2010). See
generally Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations in Law and Legal Thought, in THE NEW
LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 63 (David M. Trubek &
Alvaro Santos, eds., Cambridge Press 2006).
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"economics"), 62 as well as in the beginnings of a sea change in elite
thinking about the meaning of competitive society.63 In line with
this transformation in the attitudes of economists and politicians
about the relationship between market and government, another
shift was taking place in legal thought.64 According to Duncan Ken-
nedy, the liminal Supreme Court decision in the move from a pre-
classical to a classical style of legal thought was The Slaughterhouse
Cases.65 Interestingly, the change occurring in economic culture was
a step ahead of the legal one: where a classical reliance on the natu-
ral integrity of the private sphere was coming under shock in the
former sphere, it was in the process of being shored up in the latter.
The trigger for the case, and constitutional state action doctrine
that would develop later in The Civil Rights Cases, was the Four-
teenth Amendment, adopted in 1868.66 The text of section one reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
62 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Pro-
cess, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379 (1988) (discussing the evolution of American economic
thought in the 1800s). For a compilation of reviews of the various threads in play, see
A COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT (Warren Samuels et al. eds.,
2003).
63 See generally ERic HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EMPIRE (Pantheon Books 1987); KARL
POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1957).
' Kennedy, supra note 61.
65 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872); DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL,
supra note 34, at 77.
6 While 1868 is a key year in locating the origins of the constitutional state action
doctrine, this juridical beginning should not be confused for its much older economic
birthday, which is at least as early as 1689.
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out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
67
From this point on, any citizen of the United States wishing to
employ constitutionally delegated power against another person, be
they a public official or private actor, would have the burden of
showing that it had been the "state" which had abridged or de-
prived them of their privileges, immunities, or rights to life, liberty,
or property. 68 If the claimant failed this burden, they were left with
the weapons extant in the private law. The crucial determination
would therefore be what sorts of acts could justifiably be linked up
to the "state."
69
The facts animating the Court's 1872 decision in The Slaughter-
house Cases should sound presumptively sharp to the ears of a Hay-
ekian liberal. Louisiana's legislature sought to improve the health
and safety of working conditions involved in the slaughtering of
livestock in New Orleans through a set of sanitary regulations. Most
intrusively, the statute required all slaughtering to happen in a sin-
gle warehouse under fixed government rates. In this particular case,
a private corporation had been tasked with running the warehouse
under a charter monopoly, though the slaughterhouse policy was
being worked out in a number of states where the government di-
67U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
68 This discussion does not reach the "under color of state law" requirement in
1983 claims. For discussion, see G, Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State
Action Doctrine: The Search for Governmental Responsibility (Part II of I), 34 HouS. L.
REV. 665, 670-73 (1997). The Supreme Court has explained that "[hlike the state-action
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state-law element of
§ 1983 excludes from its reach 'merely private conduct, no matter how discriminato-
ry or wrongful."' Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999). Where, as in
Lugar, deprivations of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are alleged, these
two requirements converge. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil, 457 U.S. 922, 935, n. 18,
(1982).
69Courts have developed a number of tests for identifying the limits of "state ac-
tion." See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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rectly ran the warehouse. Quite clearly, the legislature hoped to in-
tervene in what was ostensibly understood to be the poor outcomes
of the slaughterhouse market, with or without the grant of a mo-
nopoly privilege. The question before the Court was whether local
butchers, who wanted no part of the government program, had
been deprived of their rights under the newly adopted Amend-
ment. Or in other words, was this a case of arbitrary legislation in-
terfering with the Rule of Law, or was it an example of a proper
adjustment of the common law's natural rights?
The majority opinion began by identifying the butchers' proper-
ty/liberty claim: the governmental privilege granted to the private
monopoly was said to rob the butchers "of the right to exercise their
trade, the business to which they have been trained and on which
they depend for the support of themselves and their families, and
that the unrestricted exercise of the business of butchering is neces-
sary to the daily subsistence of the population of the city." 70 The
court agreed that the butchers did indeed possess these rights, but
in a move out of line with what would come with later judicial ad-
herence to the ideology of laissez-faire, it found that the right of the
legislature to limit the areas in which slaughtering could occur, how
the slaughtering should be done, and who should be able to man-
age the enterprise, was so obviously correct that it needed "no ar-
gument to prove." 71 Even further, the simple existence of the mo-
nopoly hardly undermined the rights of the butchers in the fashion
they claimed; they could still exercise their trade, support their fam-
ilies, and provide for the town.72 As far as the states had always had
the police power to enact such regulations, it had been uncontro-
versial. 73
7oSlaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 60 (1872).
7' Id. at 61.
72 Id at 60.
"Id. at 61.
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It is with its placement of the police power in the hands of the
state legislature, however (as opposed to the federal government),
that we can detect the seeds of the classic liberal style (though not
yet the state action doctrine). Listen to the majority's description of
the state's police power:
This power is, and must be from its very nature, incapable
of any very exact definition or limitation. Upon it depends
the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen,
the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated commu-
nity, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the bene-
ficial use of property. 'It extends,' says another eminent
judge, 'to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort,
and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property
within the State; ... and persons and property are subject to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. Of the
perfect right of the legislature to do this no question ever
was, or, upon acknowledged general principles, ever can be
made, so far as natural persons are concerned.' 74
When dressed in these colors, there is no mistaking the court's
intention to situate the Louisiana legislature's slaughterhouse law
as in line with the natural flavor of the Rule of Law, and not as
apiece with the artificiality of governmental interventionism. Or to
restate, the Court is identifying a critical distinction between private
freedom and public restraint, but instead of placing the freedom-
loving Rule of Law in the private sphere, as classic liberals would
do, the Court is instead placing it in the police power of local gov-
ernment. What would signal the shift from the mood of the Slaugh-
14 Id. at 62.
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terhouse Cases would be exactly the decision to displace this power
from local legislatures and deliver it to the common law courts.75
Perhaps anticipating the classic liberal style that was just
around the corner, the plaintiff butchers argued that the Court had
gotten it wrong, and that the game had changed. Their argument
was that state legislatures no longer held the unfettered power they
once did, now that the federal constitution had been amended,
granting individuals' new powers in the market.76 If they suffered a
loss of their property rights in the slaughterhouse trade, and that
loss could be linked up with the state, the butchers believed that the
Fourteenth Amendment empowered their right to compensation.
But the Court was not convinced. The butchers clearly had a natural
right to labor, and to the fruits of that labor. State legislatures also
had a natural right to manage those rights. The federal government,
however, could not actually create any new rights that did not al-
ready pre-exist it-the amendment simply codified the rights al-
ready ensured by state government, and with regard to the relation
between the private claim and the police power, that balance was
already struck in favor of Louisiana. 77
75 The fact of legislative tinkering should be no bother in this case, for when it is
remembered that Hayek outlined the rule of law as an evolving, organic system,
subject to alterations, the desire to shape the slaughterhouse market should appease,
not embarrass.
76 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 89.
" "It would be the vainest show of learning to attempt to prove by citations of au-
thority, that up to the adoption of the recent amendments, no claim or pretence was
set up that those rights depended on the Federal government for their existence or
protection, beyond the very few express limitations which the Federal Constitution
imposed upon the States-such, for instance, as the prohibition against ex post facto
laws, bills of attainder, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts. But with the
exception of these and a few other restrictions, the entire domain of the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the States, as above defined, lay within the constitu-
tional and legislative power of the States, and without that of the Federal govern-
ment." Id. at 77.
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In terms of thinking about The Slaughterhouse Cases as a prelude
to the state action doctrine, the court made a few moves familiar to
the classic liberal style. The first was to recognize the natural rights
of private people to engage in a trade and benefit in the market. At
first blush, the way in which the court went on to reel in this right
by way of granting a legislature wide discretion in its police func-
tions might seem out of sync with the classic style. Notably, howev-
er, the court went on to characterize the state's police power in a
deeply naturalistic way, in total harmony with Lockean rights and
the Rule of Law. Second, it was federal government power that
emerged in the opinion as the artificial and arbitrary aspect of polit-
ical society about which the classic style is so nervous. Thus, the
court situated the newly minted "privileges and immunities" of the
Fourteenth Amendment as actually doing nothing new at all - these
were nothing more than the privileges and immunities already en-
joyed by the citizens of states. Because of this redundancy, the state
legislature was simply rehearsing rules already extant in the com-
mon law.
What should be clear at this point is that classic liberalism
emerged just as the judicial fascination with federalism was losing
strength. In the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Court saw the public-
private distinction that would become critical to the state action
doctrine, but it did not actually frame it as a distinction between the
"public" and the "private." Instead, the Court articulated a distinc-
tion between an organic, natural power, and an artificial and arbi-
trary power, and located this distinction in the distinction between
state and federal government. In the transition to the classic liberal
style, organic natural power shifts away from state legislatures and
into the "private," and all legislative action, whether it is state or
federal, becomes "public."
B. THE CLASSIC LIBERAL STYLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
It is here that we meet the traditional beginnings of constitu-
tional state action doctrine, as manifested in the classic liberal style.
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Moving on from "privileges and immunities," the court took up the
Amendment's "enforcement" clause eleven years later in The Civil
Rights Cases.78 Under the authority of Section 5, Congress enacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the purpose of which was to "protect
all citizens in their civil and legal rights." 79 The plaintiffs claimed
they had suffered racial discrimination (violation of freedom of con-
tract) when they were denied access to a hotel and theater, and
sought a remedy under the new Act.80 The question before the court
was whether the Fourteenth Amendment could be justifiably inter-
preted to authorize certain congressional powers in the Civil Rights
Act, and the court decided that it could not.
The court initially set up a straightforward public-private dis-
tinction. The subject matter of the Amendment had been to destroy
all forms of "state legislation, and state action of every kind," which
impaired the rights of individuals to their liberty and property
without due process. 81 "It is state action of a particular character
that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the
subject-matter of the amendment."
82
"It does not invest congress with power to legislate upon
subjects which are within the domain of state legislation;
but to provide modes of relief against state legislation, or
state action, of the kind referred to. It does not authorize
congress to create a code of municipal law for the regula-
tion of private rights; but to provide modes of redress
against the operation of state laws, and the action of state
78 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1873).
71 Id. at 4.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 11.
82 Id.
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officers, executive or judicial, when these are subversive of
the fundamental rights specified in the amendment."
83
Fair enough, but at this point the majority has not moved the
law much beyond The Slaughterhouse Cases. There, a similar distinc-
tion was posited, though in the obscuring context of the federalism
debate. What makes this decision noteworthy lies precisely in its
shedding of that obscurity.
For The Civil Rights Cases majority, and unlike its prior decision
in The Slaughterhouse Cases,84 the Fourteenth Amendment did carry
weight, legalizing a new set of powers that were now available to
market actors in their claims against state governments. The
Amendment was granted independent status and meaning, creat-
ing rights and duties that were not merely duplicative of the states'
hallowed police powers. Looking to the constitutional restraint on
any official limitation on freedom of contract, the majority used this
as an analogy for how to understand the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.8 5 According to the Court, when the Con-
stitution provided this prohibition, it set out a ground rule the pur-
pose of which was to make the common law work at its best. It was
facilitative, and entirely in concert with those just rules of conduct
that pre-existed the Constitution, and which the Constitution was
meant to protect. It was not, to be sure, an example of legislative
caprice. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment provided a ground
floor: no state can impair the rights of property and liberty, without
due process. This rule, like the prohibition against interfering with
contracts, should be understood to help facilitate a better market,
where the free play of contract and property can go about organiz-
ing a free society.
83 id.
' For discussion, see KENNEDY, supra note 34, at 77.
85 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 12 (1873).
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In contrast to such an understanding, an erroneous interpreta-
tion of the Amendment which would allow government actors to
interfere with private rights, by delegating constitutional powers to
an individual any time someone told him to keep out of his hotel or
theater, would reflect the worst type of governmental intervention-
ism. Thus, with The Civil Rights Cases the classic liberal style of mar-
ket-state was in full bloom, and in an effort to maintain the integrity
of the private law, the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act as an
unwarranted and unauthorized interference with the Rule of Law.
8 6
Though not a state action case, it seems worth situating the
classic liberal style of the market's background rules in the context
of Lochner v. New York, the case most famously associated with the
Supreme Court's adventures in economic due process.8 7 As is well-
known, the case involved a violation of New York's labor law in
which a baker had allowed his employees to work for more than
sixty hours in a week. As Justice Peckham explained, the New York
statute was highly intrusive on the natural rights of individuals to
earn a living:
"[New York's labor law] is not an act merely fixing the
number of hours which shall constitute a legal day's work,
but an absolute prohibition upon the employer permitting,
under any circumstances, more than ten hours' work to be
done in his establishment. The employee may desire to earn
the extra money which would arise from his working more
86 Id. at 9-13. Two other representative cases in the classic style are U.S. v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629 (1883) (looking at the provision of the Civil Rights Act seeking to punish
"private persons" for conspiring to deprive any one of equal protection exceeded
Congress' power), and U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1896) (looking at indictments
of white mob members who killed hundreds of blacks in the Colfax Massacre were
improper because there was no state action).
87 BERNSTEIN, supra note 27.
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than the prescribed time, but this statute forbids the em-
ployer from permitting the employee to earn it."88
In a canonical demonstration of the classic liberal style, justice
Peckham argued that the right of the state to regulate the market
through restrictions on the abilities of employers and employees to
freely contract with each other was of little value. Though the Court
admitted there might be special cases where freedom of contract
might go too far, the case of New York's labor law was surely not
among them.
The question whether this act is valid as a labor law, pure
and simple, may be dismissed in a few words. There is no
reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person
or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of la-
bor, in the occupation of a baker. There is no contention
that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and ca-
pacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or that
they are not able to assert their rights and care for them-
selves without the protecting arm of the state, interfering
with their independence of judgment and of action. They
are in no sense wards of the state. Viewed in the light of a
purely labor law, with no reference whatever to the ques-
tion of health, we think that a law like the one before us in-
volves neither the safety, the morals, nor the welfare, of the
public, and that the interest of the public is not in the
slightest degree affected by such an act. The law must be
upheld, if at all, as a law pertaining to the health of the in-
dividual engaged in the occupation of a baker. It does not
affect any other portion of the public than those who are
88 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1905). For discussion, see HORWITZ, su-
pra note 37, at 24-36.
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engaged in that occupation. Clean and wholesome bread
does not depend upon whether the baker works but ten
hours per day or only sixty hours a week. The limitation of
the hours of labor does not come within the police power
on that ground.89
Of course, the laissez-faire of "Lochnerism" would pass. As Jus-
tice Holmes predicted, "a Constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic
relation of the citizen to the state or of laissezfaire."90 Consequently,
it is tempting to conflate the story of the demise of economic due
process with the story of classic liberalism and the ground rules of
the market. But tempting as it is, it is a mistake. Lochner is a fine ex-
ample of a kind of laissez-faire,91 but it is only one example of how
background rules function in the classic liberal style. The key to see-
ing this lies in recognizing the differences in the sorts of claims aris-
ing in due process cases where there is no dispute over the state's
involvement. These are cases in which the state is undeniably in-
volved as a party in the dispute, and the controversy is centered on
what sorts of rights an individual is afforded against the state under
the due process clause. In the "state action" cases, in contrast, the
controversy often turns on whether the state is implicated in the
s Id. at 57.
90 Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
91 1 do not mean to engage here with the debate about whether laissez-faire ever
really existed. As liberals like Hayek, Wilhelm Roepke, and Deepak Lal have all ar-
gued, those out to attack laissez-faire have usually found themselves attacking straw
men. The reason they distance themselves from laissez-faire is that they have seen it
characterized as a vulgar view of the market in which market freedoms are believed
to exist without any assistance from the state at all. My real engagement here is with
classic liberalism, which takes as a baseline the need for background rules, and not
with a caricature of laissez-faire. For the neoliberal critique of laissez-faire, see
HAYEK, supra note 44; Wilhelm Roepke, Economic Order and International Law, 86
RECUEIL DES CoURS 203 (1954); DEEPAK LAL, THE POVERTY OF 'DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS' (First MIT Press Ed. 1985).
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controversy at all, and the effort to answer that question turns on a
theory of market and state-where does the one begin and where
does the other end. Thus, with the disappearance of economic due
process constitutional law writ large seemed to emerge in non-
economic terms. Seeing CSAD as supplying the ground rules of
competition law remedies this mistake, and brings focus to the no-
tion that Lochner was only a single manifestation of the economic
power of the constitution, 92 and hardly the only or even most effec-
tive one.
C. THE MODERN LIBERAL STYLE: SHELLEY AND REITMAN
If the classic liberal style of placing the Constitution at the be-
hest of the private law is well illustrated by the early state action
cases, the modern liberal style was at work in the well-known and
well-criticized 1948 case of Shelley v. Kraemer.93 As a clue to where
92 MICHELMAN, FRANK I., Economic Power and the Constitution, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, 45 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., Oxford University
Press, 2009).
9 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Here is a sample of decisions in the modem style: Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (political parties, although "voluntary associations,"
cannot exclude blacks from voting in primary elections; doing so would be unconsti-
tutional state action); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (prohibition in privately
owned town held unconstitutional because town looked like governmental unit);
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (extending Smith v. Allwright and holding that
pre-primary election processes cannot exclude blacks); Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (racial discrimination by restaurant located in state-
owned building is unconstitutional state action; question is whether there is suffi-
ciently close nexus with government, through relationship such as contract, authori-
zation, or regulation, that court can attribute conduct to the government); Peterson v.
City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (convicting blacks for a restaurant sit-in suffi-
ciently satisfied state action, regardless of whether the store managers' sole reason
for reporting them was to comply with ordinances forbidding restaurants to seat
whites and blacks together); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (holding that a
privately owned park was still "municipal in nature" and therefore allowing only
whites in the park was unconstitutional state action; New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 288 (1964) (holding that enforcing a defamation suit that was
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this decision was heading, the majority began its analysis of a cut-
and-dried property law dispute with a radical proposition: "[b]asic
constitutional issues of obvious importance have been raised."94 The
topic was restrictive covenants: the capacity of property owners to
prospectively determine to whom their land could, and could not,
eventually pass. The controversial aspect of these covenants, how-
ever, was that they excluded the possibility on the basis of race. Af-
ter a black family took ownership of a home that had been subject
to a racially restrictive covenant, a neighboring family brought an
action to enjoin the purchasers from taking residence. The Missouri
Supreme Court agreed with the neighbors and held the covenant to
be effective and enforceable.
The purchasers appealed to the US Supreme Court, and argued
that in its enforcement of Missouri's property and contract rules, the
Missouri Supreme Court had impaired their constitutional rights to
equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amend-
against civil rights expression was a state violation of the 1st Amendment); Amalga-
mated Food Emps. Union v. Logan, 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (holding that a large, private-
ly-owned shopping center was similar to a business district and therefore could not
enjoin picketing); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972): (holding that it was ok
to enjoin picketers in a similar case); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967): (holding
that a California landlord's racial discrimination in renting was state action because a
California constitutional amendment, which was neutral on its face, authorized the
discrimination); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969): (holding a private
company's institution of a prejudgment garnishment order, consistent with a Wis-
consin statute, to have violated Due Process); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972):
(holding that a creditor's violation of a debtor's due process rights by seizing proper-
ty pursuant to Florida state procedures, was state action subject to the Due Process
Clause); see generally Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (finding that when
the state gives textbooks or any other aid to private schools which discriminate based
on race, it participates in unconstitutional state action); N. Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (holding that Georgia statutes allowing officers to
issue writs of garnishment constituted state action, and violated the Due Process
clause).
94 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 4.
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ment.95 There should be no mistaking where this decision would
have gone had it been in the hands of a judge speaking classic liber-
alism. If the new homebuyers are complaining about the effects of
the private law, they are out of luck since judicial elaboration of the
common law is not perceived as an act of state, thus putting their
claim out of the Amendment's reach. But as this court framed it,
"Participation of the State consists in the enforcement of the re-
strictions so defined. The crucial issue with which we are here con-
fronted is whether this distinction removes these cases from the
operation of the prohibitory provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."9
6
In approaching the question, the court was appropriately mod-
est as the modem style would indicate: the majority did not hold all
private agreements to have the color of state action, even though
our notions of "bargain" and "ownership" would be meaningless in
the absence of some constituting legal regime.97 Thus, the division
between the independent market and the regulating state still held
firm: "restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as a
violation of any rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth
Amendment. So long as the purposes of those agreements are effec-
tuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear clear
that there has been no action by the State and the provisions of the
Amendment have not been violated." 98 That dividing line, though
it would hold, was nevertheless about to take a beating: "But here
there was more. These are cases in which the purposes of the
agreements were secured only by judicial enforcement by state
9' Id. at 7-8.96 Id. at 13.
97 
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: VOLUME 2, 35 (1st ed.
1976).
9' Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13.
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courts of the restrictive terms of the agreements." 99 Voluntary
agreements between individuals seeking to buy and sell land, the
court explained, did not implicate the state. The judicial enforce-
ment of those agreements, however, did.100
Though the decision might be confusing when read against its
precedential contexts, it makes perfect sense when perceived as the
work of a modem liberal. For such a writer, several points raise to
the surface: (1) free competition in the market can have morally re-
pugnant results; (2) government needs to intervene, aggressively if
need be, to counteract those tendencies if the market is to be sus-
tainable; (3) some amount of space, necessarily left undefined,
should be left to the natural sphere of the market. Shelley brings it
home: the court was deeply troubled by the social consequences of
an unchecked property/ contract matrix with respect to racial ine-
qualities; the court argued for a more "realistic" view of the state,
which definitively exercised its power not only through the execu-
tive and the legislature, but through its courts as well; the court still
managed to carve out an area where the state was "absent."
9 Id. at 13-14.
"Similar expressions, giving specific recognition to the fact that judicial action
is to be regarded as action on the State for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, are to be found in numerous cases which have been more recently decided. In
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1908), the Court said, "The judicial act of
the highest court of the state, in authoritatively construing and enforcing its laws, is
the act of the state." In Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680
(1930) the Court, through Justice Brandeis, stated, "'The federal guaranty of due
process extends to state action through its judicial as well as through its legislative,
executive, or administrative branch of government.' Further examples of such decla-
rations in the opinions of this Court are not lacking." Id. at 15. The Court went on to
clarify that even those judicial proceedings free from any irregularities should be
understood as acts of state. "It has been recognized that the action of state courts in
enforcing a substantive common-law rule formulated by those courts, may result in
the denial of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the
judicial proceedings in such cases may have been in complete accord with the most
rigorous conceptions of procedural due process." Id. at 17.
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Another Supreme Court decision emblematic of the modern
liberal style is Reitman v. Mulkey,10 1 decided in 1967. The question
before the court was whether a section of the California Constitu-
tion denied California residents equal protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 10 2 That section, submitted to the electorate as a
proposition in 1964, prohibited any state official or agency from
interfering with the unfettered discretion of property owners to sell,
lease, or rent their property. 10 3 The question arose in the context of a
black family whose application to rent an apartment had been re-
jected solely on the basis of their race.1°4 Under the authority of the
equal protection clause, the plaintiffs needed to show that the state
was somehow implicated in the property owner's choice to exclude
them on racial grounds. Depending on the legal style in which a
judge approaches the requirement, this could be a piece of a cake
for the plaintiff, or a piece of very heavy lifting.
Naturally, the classic jurist would easily dispose of the claim:
nothing could be more central to the purpose of a constitution than
to secure the rights of individuals to alienate their property on the
market as they see fit, and once the constitution has set the ground
rules in this way, there is no merit in finding any acts of state. This
is simply what Hayek called "planning for competition." 105 In
Reitman, however, the court was in a modern mood, and ap-
proached the California rule accordingly: "We first turn to the opin-
'
0 1 
387 U.S. 369 (1967).
102 Article 1, section 26, in relevant part, reads: "Neither the State nor any subdivi-
sion or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of
any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real
property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as
he, in his absolute discretion, chooses." Id. at 388 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I § 26,
which was later held unconstitutional in Strauss v. Horton, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591
(2009)).
'03 Id. at 371.
'H K Id. at 372.
105 HAYEK, supra note 43, at 42.
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ion of that court in Reitman, which quite properly undertook to ex-
amine the constitutionality of § 26 in terms of its 'immediate objec-
tive,' its 'ultimate effect' and its 'historical context and the condi-
tions existing prior to its enactment."' 106 By taking account of these
broader social contexts, the court found it easy to bear down on the
California rule, attacking its illegitimate purpose of seeking to "to
overturn state laws that bore on the right of private sellers and les-
sors to discriminate,'- the Unruh and Rumford Acts - and 'to fore-
stall future state action that might circumscribe this right."' 107 The
court explained that while it had never sought to solve the "impos-
sible task" of finding the line between private and state action, it
did believe that an ad hoc, case-by-case method was an appropriate
methodology. 108 On the instant facts, the attempt by California's
legislature to provide further empowerment to those market actors
seeking to be racially selective in how they alienated their proper-
ties seemed to be enough.10 9
What is important to see about this decision is not that the court
adopted a functionalist, case-by-case, balancing test. It is rather how
the court adopted this approach, and though we cannot know the
intimate thoughts of the justices, the inescapable message is that
this court was not persuaded by the idea that the purpose of a con-
stitution is only to plan for a competitive society. If the Constitu-
tion's singular function was to protect Lockean property and con-
106 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 (1967). For a discussion of functionalism
as a historical technology, see Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV.
57 (1984); Robert Gordon, 'Critical Legal Histories' Revisited: A Response, 37 LAw & Soc.
INQ. 200 (2012).
07 Id. at 374.
'0' Id. at 378.
'o9 Id. at 378-79. "Here the California court, armed as it was with the knowledge of
the facts and circumstances concerning the passage and potential impact of § 26, and
familiar with the milieu in which that provision would operate, has determined that
the provision would involve the State in private racial discriminations to an uncon-
stitutional degree. We accept this holding of the California court." Id.
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tract rights, the Reitman court surely got this one wrong. On the
other hand, a court persuaded that constitutional law has a deeper
purpose than merely playing handmaiden to the organizational
powers of the competitive society, and that this purpose may often
entail a direct manipulation of competition itself, would have
agreed with the result, if not the reasoning. To be sure, the modern
view of constitutional purpose does not necessarily generate a bal-
ancing approach to legal decision-making. But that is not the
point-the point is that in the modern style, balancing is at least
available; in the classic style, it is not.
D. THE NEOLIBERAL STYLE: FLAGG BROTHERS, RENDELL-BAKER,
AND MORRISON
The idea of social planning had gained in popularity after
WWII to the point of having painted the classic style into a corner.
By the late 1970s, however, modem liberalism had itself come un-
der attack, and the classic image of market and state was enjoying a
major comeback. With the ascent of Thatcher, Reagan, and a gen-
eral program very much in line with a strict separation of private
and public, and competition and intervention, the classic view was
re-launched. 110 Unlike the Court's positively unfashionable com-
..0 As David Harvey has described it, this exploding new style of political econo-
my proposed "that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized
by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is
to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices....
Furthermore, if markets do not exist...then they must be created, by state action if
necessary .... State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare
minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough
information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest
groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democra-
cies) for their own benefit." HARVEY, supra note 40, at 2.
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mitment to laissez-faire in the early twentieth century,11 ' it was at
this moment that William Rehnquist joined the neoliberal zeitgeist,
resurrecting the classic style of state action jurisprudence.
12
Decided in 1978, Flagg Brothers v. Brooks" 3 involved a claim by
an evicted tenant against the company storing the tenant's seized
property. After a dispute between the company and the tenant over
the proper amount of charges for the storage, the company sought
to invoke a self-help mechanism in the New York Uniform Com-
mercial Code enabling it to sell the goods to a third party.114 The
tenant argued that the company was barred by the Fourteenth
Amendment from selling the goods without due process. In the
classic style, the Supreme Court suggested that the storage compa-
ny was merely exercising its right to creditor remedies existing at
common law, and that as a result, "the conduct of private actors in
relying on the rights established under these liens to resort to self-
help remedies does not permit their conduct to be ascribed to the
state."" 5 Providing a little more nuance, the court attempted to jus-
tify this return to the old style by explaining that whereas prior de-
cisions had affirmatively identified the state action element in the
instance of a creditor being assisted by way of the threat of state
sanction in its repossession of a debtor's property, this case was dif-
ferent. Here, New York's rule never engaged in any affirmative in-
tervention; instead it permitted the storage company to dispose of
" For a counter-story to the traditional narrative of the court's commitment to
laissez-faire, see David Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the
Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003).
112 See generally THE REHNQUIST LEGACY (Craig M. Bradley ed. 2006).
". 436 U.S. 149 (1978). For the classic review of Flagg Brothers, see Paul Brest, State
Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PENN. L. REv.
1296 (1982).
"' Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 153-54.
.. Id. at 162 n.11.
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the property that it had acquired without any assistance from the
state.
Underlining just what was happening here, the court conclud-
ed, "[i]t would intolerably broaden, beyond the scope of any of our
previous cases, the notion of state action under the Fourteenth
Amendment to hold that the mere existence of a body of property
law in a State, whether decisional or statutory, itself amounted to
'state action' even though no state process or state officials were
ever involved in enforcing that body of law." 116 Thus, with a single
shot, the Court brought back the tattered rags of a heavy public-
private distinction, the idea that judicial elaboration of the common
law was not state action in the relevant sense, and the belief that
affirmative delegations of constitutional power to market actors
would only be acceptable when the legislature had done something
more than codify an existing common law rule.
Four years later, the Court decided Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,117 this
time with Chief Justice Burger writing for the majority. At issue in
the case was a § 1983 claim on the part of dismissed teachers from
an arguably private school in Brookline, Massachusetts. After vocal-
izing disagreements with the school's director over giving more
representation to students on a student-staff council, the teachers
were fired. The question was whether, in discharging the teachers
for their statements in support of the students, the director was act-
ing under color of state law-a question identical to state action
analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment.118 If the director's re-
sponse could not be conceived as state action, the teachers would
have failed to state a claim.
16 Id. at 160 n.10.
..7 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
"8 Id. at 839.
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The school was regulated by a Massachusetts law designed to
provide children with physical or emotional disabilities individual-
ized educational programs, specifically tailored to their special
needs. According to the statute, such children were to be identified
by school committees established in all Massachusetts towns. In
providing this benefit, the committee could offer the programs ei-
ther through public schools, or by contracting with private schools.
Defendant New Perspectives School was such a private school, con-
tracted through the school committees of Boston and Brookline to
implement special education programs. 1 9 At the time of the contro-
versy, all students at the school had been placed there through state
program. Almost all of the school's funding came from both state
and federal agencies, and due to the nature of the special education
mandate, the bulk of the school's daily operations were intensively
monitored and regulated by state actors.
Relying on its recent decision in Blum v. Yaretsky,120 the Court
had little trouble determining that this had not been a case of state
action. First, New Perspectives was privately owned.1 21 Just be-
cause a private business may receive state funding for its activities,
even substantial amounts of such funding, this in and of itself
would not represent the state's coercion of the private party. We
can intuit from the Court's reasoning that so long as the private par-
ty retains a meaningful capacity for representing its will, the state's
encouragement and support for the private party does not present
the sort of state influence necessary to trigger 1983 or the Four-
teenth Amendment. With respect to the claim that the school's op-
erations were intensely regulated, the Court managed the problem
in a similar way: there was no evidence that any state official had
.
9 Id. at 845.
120 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
121 Kohn, 457 U.S. at 840.
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influenced the school's director in her decision to fire the teach-
ers. 122 Finally, the Court explained that while the school was clearly
serving a public function as mandated under Massachusetts law, it
was not a public function that had been the traditional prerogative
of the state.' 23 There was simply nothing that tied the school to the
state in such a way that the powers imminent in a 1983 claim could
be unlocked on behalf of the teachers.
The neoliberal revival continued, though not without interrup-
tion.124 For example, American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Com-
pany v. Sullivan,125 decided in 1999, continued to teach the value of
the classic masters: in its adjudication of a dispute between an em-
ployee and an insurance company, where the employee's benefits
had been suspended by the company pursuant to Pennsylvania's
complex and comprehensive worker compensation law and its at-
tendant institutions, the court held that the state had not "exercised
coercive power or... provided such significant encouragement, ei-
ther overt or covert, that the choice [of the insurance company]
122 Id. at 841-42.
123 Id. at 842.
124 In the contemporary period, the Court has taken an eclectic approach to its
style of state action jurisprudence. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460
(2009); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47
(2006); Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001);
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000); Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) (finding that Amtrak
is a government entity and therefore could not prohibit political billboards from train
stations since doing so would be a violation of free speech); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete, 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (finding that a preemptory challenge to exclude jurors
based on race was unconstitutional); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty., 489 U.S. 189
(1989) (finding that the state's failure to protect a four-year-old child when the Social
Services office had received numerous complaints of abuse did not constitute State
Action); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (finding that UNLV's suspension of
a student was state action, but the NCAA was not the state, so the NCAA's rules
would not be considered violative of the constitution).
2' Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
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must in law be deemed to be that of the State." 126 In 2000, the court
decided the well-known Violence Against Women Act case, U.S. v.
Morrison.1 27 Going further in demonstrating the neoliberal style, the
court rejected the argument that Congress was authorized under
the Fourteenth Amendment to provide victims of gender violence a
civil remedy. Citing the 1875 decision of United States v. Cruik-
shank,128 the court emphasized that though the Amendment did es-
tablish a right to due process and equal protection "this adds noth-
ing to the rights of one citizen as against another. It simply furnish-
es an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the States
upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a
member of society." 129
E. SUMMARY
This discussion of the constitutional state action doctrine had
three aims. The first was to show how liberal legalism provides an
extremely helpful way of making sense of the otherwise confusing
terrain of constitutional state action doctrine. Though it is a com-
monplace in the literature to look at the doctrine and see a mess of
disorder as a result of the law's reliance on an ultimately unworka-
ble public-private distinction, liberal legalism gives us a roadmap
that is both elegant and effective. As discussed, constitutional state
action doctrine can be mapped into three discrete styles, and partic-
ularly when that map is read in the historical context of political
change, the use of a particular style at a particular moment makes a
lot of sense.
26 Id. at 52.
127 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
128 Id. at 622 (citing Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554).
129 Id. (citing Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554).
State Action Doctrine
The second aim was to show how these three styles had differ-
ent ways of approaching the basic idea of the role of law in market
society. In the classic liberal style, law was seen as generative of the
market. Property and contract rules in particular were deemed as
essential and apolitical ingredients in the constitution of the eco-
nomic sphere. The purpose of constitutional law, in this view, was
merely to shield these background rules from state intervention.
The notion that markets might require foreground rules to function
was not a notion with any appeal. This represented a very sharp
distinction between the sphere of private law, doing all the work in
making markets happen, and a public sphere, which had very little
work to do at all. In the modern liberal style, this orientation to-
wards the role of law in the market changed. Instead of putting a
premium on the private law to do all the work, modern liberals
welcomed the application of foreground rules by giving plaintiffs
greater access to constitutional powers in private law disputes. In
the modern liberal style, the notion of "state action" was expanded
so as to allow more cognizance of the connection between the pri-
vate and public spheres. Whereas modern liberals weakened the
public-private distinction in their attempts to gain more "control" of
the market, the neoliberal reaction turned back in nostalgia to the
classic liberal fascination with background rules. The public-private
distinction was shored up once again, and the idea that background
rules were the appropriate area of concentration in forming market
society was vindicated.
The third aim of this Part builds off of the second, which is to
emphasize the economic character of constitutional state action doc-
trine. This is a character that is very different from the economic
due process of Lochner, and an aspect of constitutional state action
doctrine that persists to the present. Indeed, the constitutional in-
terpretation of property and contract has played, and continues to
play, a foundational role in the construction of American competi-
tion law. Or in other words, constitutional adjudications of property
and contract provide the background rules of competition law- the
rules against which the more popular foreground rules of competi-
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tion law, namely antitrust, go about their business. This discussion
of constitutional state action doctrine is therefore intended to set up
the discussion of antitrust law in the next Part, and more particular-
ly, anticipate the deep linkage between the constitutional and anti-
trust state action doctrines -a linkage that turns on a shared alli-
ance with a view of market society.
III. THE FOREGROUND RULES OF COMPETITION LAW: ANTITRUST
STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
According to the conventional story, Lochnerism was beheaded
in 1937 with the Court's famous decision in West Coast Hotel v. Par-
rish.1 30 There, Chief Justice Hughes explained that the Constitution's
"guaranty of liberty does not withdraw from legislative supervision
that wide department of activity which consists of the making of
contracts, or deny to government the power to provide restrictive
safeguards." 131 Five years later, the Court decided Wickard v.
Filburn,132 substantially augmenting federal power over all intra-
state transactions that had an effect on interstate commerce, and six
years after that, as discussed above, the Court decided Shelley, the
proverbial bombshell which left commentators wondering if any-
thing was really left of the private sphere.
Thus, it was in the wake of this post-1937 "constitutional revo-
lution" that antitrust law was also seen as requiring a makeover.133
130 West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
13' Id. at 392.
132 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942).
33 Among the events surrounding this phase were the investigations of the Tem-
porary National Economic Committee and the placement of Thurman Arnold as
head of the new antitrust division. For discussion see, e.g., ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END
OF REFORM, NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR (Vintage Books 1996);
MERLE FAINSOD & LINCOLN GORDON, GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
(1941); TONY FREYER, ANTITRUST AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM, 1930-2004 8-59 (2006);
THOMAS MCCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984); ELLIS HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL
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In 1938, President Franklin Roosevelt inaugurated a new moment in
the governmental commitment to antitrust enforcement in an anti-
monopoly message proclaiming antitrust law as a shield against
fascism and collectivism.1M Likely the most apparent example of the
fresh wave of energy injected into the antitrust enterprise was the
selection of Thurman Arnold, a professor at Yale Law School who
was associated by many with legal realism, to head up the newly
minted antitrust division at the Department of Justice. 135 Arnold,
along with Supreme Court justices like William Douglass and Hugo
Black,136 resuscitated the modern complaint that had stirred up an
interest in making an antitrust law in the first place. Pushing the
classic focus on property and contract rights to the periphery, the
modern style of antitrust adopted once again the hope for manag-
ing market performance, and the provision of aid to the small busi-
ness owner 137 and the consumer. 138 Social health, competitive pric-
AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1974); WYATT WELLS, ANTITRUST AND THE
FORMATION OF THE POSTWAR WORLD (2002).
114 FREYER, supra note 134, at 8 n.1. See also DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM
FEAR, 1929-1945 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1999); ROBERT DIVINE, THE ILLUSION OF
NEUTRALITY (Univ. of Chi. Press, 1962).
"' See generally SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY (2005).
136 See RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992, 112, 173
(Oxford Univ. Press 1996).
137 Fashion Organizers Guild of Am. v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457 (1941) represents the
Court's focus on the small business owner as a key protected class under the anti-
trust laws. Here, consumer welfare would play second fiddle to a perceived need to
protect the liberty of small entrepreneurs. As Justice Black explained, "While a con-
spiracy to fix prices is illegal, an intent to increase prices is not an ever-present essen-
tial of conduct amounting to a violation of the policy of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts; a monopoly contrary to their policies can exist even though a combination may
temporarily or even permanently reduce the price of the articles manufactured or
sold . . . Trade or commerce under those circumstances may nevertheless be badly
and unfortunately restrained by driving out of business the small dealers and wor-
thy men whose lives have been spent therein, and who might be unable to readjust
themselves to their altered surroundings. Mere reduction in the price of the com-
modity dealt in might be dearly paid for by the ruin of such a class and the absorp-
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ing, and avoiding the "curse of bigness" were the new ideals of the
modern liberal style.
139
In many histories of antitrust law, the discussion at this point
turns to well-known cases like Fashion Organizers Guild of America
and Socony Vacuum. Though it is true that these and other cases il-
lustrate the shift in thinking about the benefits of state intervention
in the competitive process, the discussion here will focus instead on
a string of cases associated with the antitrust state action doctrine, 140
dated to the 1943 Supreme Court decision in Parker v. Brown.
141 This
more heterodox trajectory is helpful for two reasons: (1) it empha-
sizes the regulatory alliance between the two state action doctrines,
tion of control over one commodity by an all powerful combination of capital." Id at
467.
138 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. 310 U.S. 150 (1940) illustrates the
Court's mission, this time with the pen of William Douglas, of protecting the con-
sumer at the expense of big and small business owners alike. It didn't matter for the
court that small enterprises were helped out in the process of major oil companies
stabilizing prices for the benefit of small producers stranded with excess capacity.
The purpose of the law, according to the court, was to leave price control to the mar-
ket, not to human beings. Price-fixing was per se illegal, and the Rule of Reason
would have little to say about it.
39 In a contemporary rendering of the goals of antitrust law, former chairman of
the FTC, Tim Muris, has suggested that "Although disagreements exist in close cas-
es, there is widespread agreement that the clearly articulated purpose of antitrust is
to protect consumers, that economic analysis should guide case selection, and that
horizontal cases, both mergers and agreements among competitors, are the main-
stays of enforcement. Moreover, today there is bipartisan recognition that antitrust
law is a way of helping to organize our economy. A freely functioning market, sub-
ject to the rules of antitrust, provides maximum benefits to consumers." Timothy J.
Muris, Principlesfor a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 165, 168 (2005).
But see John J. Flynn, The Role of Rules in Antitrust Analysis, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 605
(2006).
140 Like the constitutional state action doctrine, the antitrust state action doctrine
has also generated a long list of enemies.
141 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). As Herbert Hovenkamp has pointed out,
the Court first dealt with a state action question in the context of an antitrust case in
Northern Securities. The discussion, however, was quick. See Hovenkamp, supra note
8, at 628.
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and (2) it illuminates an interesting and counter-intuitive use of the
public-private distinction in the context of modern liberalism.
As for the first point about the alliance between the two state
action doctrines, it should be recalled that there is a long-standing
temptation to think about the fall of laissez-faire constitutionalism as
the end of the line when it came to the judicial deployment of con-
stitutional law as a factor in the legal conception of the market. As
explained above, there is a persistent story about the Supreme
Court's entanglement with "economic due process," an affair that
was thankfully terminated in the years before WWII. What this sto-
ry hides, however, and what is helpfully illuminated in the focus on
state action cases, is that laissez-faire constitutionalism was just one
variety, of the "economic constitution."
Of course, one might counter at this point that this is all well
and good in the case of constitutional state action doctrine, but what
does this have to do with antitrust state action? It must be admitted
at the outset that, as Herbert Hovenkamp has explained, antitrust
state action doctrine and the constitutional state action doctrine are
not typically understood to have much to do with one another:
"The antitrust 'state action' doctrine is different from and
much narrower than the Fourteenth Amendment state ac-
tion doctrine, and the two are rarely confused. The Four-
teenth Amendment doctrine automatically extends to all
states and government subdivisions, as well as their offi-
cials acting under color of state law and occasionally even
private entities performing public functions. In contrast, the
antitrust state action immunity applies only where the re-
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quirements of clear articulation and active supervision of
private conduct have been met."142
No doubt, Hovenkamp is precisely right with respect to his de-
scription of the two doctrines, as well as the point that the two are
rarely discussed together. But the impulse to keep the two doctrines
at a distance - an impulse I do not mean to ascribe to Hovenkamp -
inadvertently furthers the erroneous intuition that the constitutional
state action doctrine has nothing to do with the making of the mar-
ket. As the argument here has suggested, this is a mistake, at least
in the context of liberal legalism. In that context, constitutional state
action doctrine is fundamentally about how to arrange the competi-
tive conditions of the market-just as is the antitrust state action
doctrine. Thus, even with their admittedly differing scopes and
sources, the two state action doctrines have a similar mission. Both
doctrines have as their purpose a way of fixing a line between pub-
lic and private in the larger project of guaranteeing a competitive
market society. In the area of constitutional law, this happens in the
background, but in antitrust law, the question is foregrounded to
the extent a court is asked to decide whether the state, or an agent
of the state, has been justified in its express tinkering with the com-
petitive process. Thus, to understand constitutional state action doc-
trine without a view of the field of antitrust provides a limited un-
derstanding of the two complementary dimensions of competition
policy in the modern liberal style.
The second reason for resisting the orthodox story and instead
focusing on antitrust state action doctrine is of another sort. In ge-
neric antitrust cases decided in the 1940s and after, courts were typ-
ically focused on the competitive process, the wrongs private actors
make against each other, and the unfair burden on small business
142 Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 629 n.15.
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owners in making their way through that process. These are largely
cases looking at the scope of what was deemed to be fair play-a
scope that began to shrink as courts came to the modem liberal
style. In contrast, what is sharpened in the antitrust state action cas-
es was the Court's distinct analysis of state actors engaged in activi-
ties that would otherwise be characterized as direct violations of the
classic liberal background rules, or to put it in the contemporary
vernacular, inefficient and anticompetitive state action. In these cas-
es, state actors were doing things that had they been committed by
private actors, would have been beyond the pale.
There is therefore a critical use of a public-private distinction
going on in the antitrust state action cases which is nicely juxta-
posed against the public-private distinction operating in the consti-
tutional state action area. In the setting of modern liberalism, the
public-private distinction in constitutional state action doctrine is
weak. As demonstrated in the peak case of Shelley, private property
claims took on a constitutional gloss when they were made in the
context of judicially enforced restrictive covenants -a move that is
hostile if not totally oblivious to the idea of a public-private distinc-
tion. In the modern liberal style of antitrust state action doctrine,
however, the Court uses a powerful commitment to a public-private
distinction, a commitment similarly motivated by a desire to curtail
the free play of private law rules and give discretion to the state in
arranging market outcomes. Thus, a key reason for coupling the
two state action doctrines is that in doing so we are able to highlight
the counter-intuitive idea that within modern liberalism it is possi-
ble to carry a brief for state interventionism either through a strong
or a weak form of the public-private distinction. The upshot: a struc-
tural approach to state action doctrine demonstrates the linguistic
aspect of legal thought. In this sense, the public-private distinction
emerges as a relatively open way of speaking law, and less as a le-
gal concept preexisting judicial analysis.
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A. PRELUDE: THE SHERMAN ACT
The modern liberal style emerged in the late nineteenth centu-
ry in the context of massive, popular discontent with entrenched
political commitments to laissez-faire. This discontent had several
sources, including a worldwide economic depression spanning the
years from the 1870s to the 1890s, the rapid concentration of capital
in and among the new trusts, and the apparently widening gap be-
tween the bourgeois and laboring classes. 143 As for the merger
movement, it was aided by a combination of factors, including the
acceleration of transportation and communication facilities, and the
enlarged capacity to make and sell more products in wider swaths
of marketable territory.144 This capacity was in turn spurred on by
technological innovations which generated more efficient manufac-
turing processes, along with revolutions in managerial control,
making labor more efficient as well.14 5 The upshot was an environ-
ment in which firms found it advantageous to get bigger and big-
ger, merging where possible to take advantage of economies of
scale.1 46 In Louis Brandeis' famous phrasing, this became known as
the "Curse of Bigness." 147 Popular reaction against what was be-
lieved to be the true face of laissez-faire was both broad and deep.1 48
141 See ROBERT HEILBRONER, THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC SOCIETY (1985).




1 See ALFRED CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
146 HOVENKAMP, supra note 144, at 241-42.
147 LOUIS BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS (1934).
141 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911) (summing up the
context for the Senate debates on the establishment of the antitrust act: "They conclu-
sively show, however, that the main cause which led to the legislation was the
thought that it was required by the economic condition of the times; that is, the vast
accumulation of wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals, the enormous
development of corporate organization, the facility for combination which such or-
ganizations afforded, the fact that the facility was being used, and that combinations
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Here is a common example, found in Upton Sinclair's anthology on
social protest:
The march of invention has clothed mankind with powers
of which the boldest imagination a century ago could not
have dreamed. But in factories where labor-saving machin-
ery has reached its most wonderful development, little
children are at work; wherever the new forces are anything
like fully utilized, large classes are maintained by charity or
live on the verge of recourse to it; amid the greatest accu-
mulations of wealth, men die of starvation, and puny in-
fants suckle dry breasts; while everywhere the greed of
grain, the worship of wealth, shows the force of the fear of
want. The promised land flies before us like the mirage.
149
The United States government reacted in several ways to the
crisis of laissez-faire, most obviously after the crash of the stock mar-
ket and the Great Depression of the 1930s, though in important
ways that predated the New Deal as well.150 Among these respons-
es, and the one most focused on the idea that something had some-
how gone wrong with the competitive process itself, was the adop-
known as trusts were being multiplied, and the widespread impression that their
power had been and would be exerted to oppress individuals and injure the public
generally.").
4 9 
UPTON SINCLAIR, THE CRY FOR JUSTICE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF THE LITERATURE OF
SOCIAL PROTEST 116-17 (1921).
"o See, e.g., DANIEL BELAND, SOCIAL SECURITY: HISTORY AND POLITICS FROM THE
NEW DEAL TO THE PRIVATIZATION DEBATE (Univ. Press of Kansas 2005); RICHARD
JOSEPH, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN INCOME TAx (2004); MICHAEL PARRISH,
SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL (1970); RICHARD D. STONE, THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION AND THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY OF
REGULATORY POLICY (1991); George Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative
Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557 (1996).
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tion of a federal antitrust law.151 In the late 1880s, Congress debated
the central issue: did the concept of competition, so deeply embed-
ded in the fabric of America's socio-political make-up, produce
morally unacceptable consequences? For many, such a question was
really hard on the ears, because if this was so, it could potentially
implicate the classic liberal style of property and contract -an im-
plication very few have ever been willing to seriously entertain. A
more palatable way of looking at the curse of bigness was to ask
whether the problem could be located in a handful of entrepreneurs
who were cheating in a game that, at its bottom, was really and tru-
ly governed by a set of morally desirable ground rules.
152
The result of the debate was less than satisfying for any legisla-
tor hopeful for a muscular response to the problem of the trusts.
153
The relevant text of the resulting Sherman Act made illegal "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspira-
cy, in restraint of trade," and threatened to criminalize "[e]very per-
son who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
151 For histories of the federal anti-trust law see ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX (The Free Press 1993); TONY FREYER, ANTITRUST AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM,
1930-2004 (2006); Peritz, supra note 136; BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 33, at
175; Eleanor Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981); El-
eanor Fox, The Sherman Antitrust Act and the World - Let Freedom Ring, 59 ANTITRUST
L.J. 109 (1990); Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism
and the Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017 (1988); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust
Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105, 127 (1989); Robert
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982); James May, Antitrust in the Form-
ative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 50 OHIO
ST. L.J. 257 (1989); Alan Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L.
REV. 1 (1999); William Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44
EMORY L.J. 1 (1995).
152 See PERITZ, supra note 136.
' Id. at 286 n. 5 (citing Joseph Auerbach, President Roosevelt and the Trusts, 175 N.
AM. REV. 877, 891 (1902) (describing the legislation as "crudely drawn, imperfectly,
considered, hastily enacted")). For discussion, see Crane infra.
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conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States."154 It was up the
courts to figure out just what these phrases were going to mean in
the context of Upton Sinclair's America.
Antitrust scholars refer to the years from the Sherman Act's
adoption in 1892 to 1911 as antitrust law's "formative" years.
55
What was formative about it was the idea that it was in these years
that the Supreme Court wrestled with the Sherman Act's normative
foundations. 156 Against the backdrop of intense social unrest, the
question was how the Sherman Act would mobilize the judiciary
against complaints about vulgar disparities between the giant com-
binations on the one side and the small businessman and poor la-
114 15 U.S.C. §§1, 2.
155 Rudolph Peritz explained, "The two decades between 1911 and 1933 can be
understood as a series of efforts to make a place for cooperative associations, for the
collective actions of economics and political groups, in a classical political economy
and ideology founded in individualism. Classical theory and ideology were called
upon to accommodate new social and economic practices." PERITZ, supra note 136, at
59. Peritz offers a useful counter-history, outlining how these early cases were more
complicated than is typically suggested. Id. at 27. My discussion of these opposing
views reverses Peritz' description of competition and property logics in the works of
the literalist and Rule of Reason camps, but I believe my analysis is apiece with his.
After Standard Oil, the rule of reason would become focused on "competitive effects"
as a function of its allegiance to the classic liberal style of protecting the core of pri-
vate law from state intervention. Thus, I would certainly agree that the Rule of Rea-
son and the court's focus on "competition" belied its "real" basis in limiting the
Court's hands in the work of social planning.
16 Robert Bork argued in The Antitrust Paradox that the Standard Oil decision of
1911 was critical in pushing the Court out of a period where antitrust law was large-
ly considered "unworkable or unintelligible, or more likely, both." BORK, supra note
151 at 34. Among the apparent assets of the decision were its acceptance of a Rule of
Reason, an explicit connect of the Sherman Act to the common law, a choice about
the Sherman Act's appropriate goal of maximizing consumer welfare. Id. Saddened
by the fact that a classic liberal style of antitrust was short-lived, Bork lamented:
"These were considerable accomplishments, and had they not been badly, perhaps
fatally flawed, the Sherman Act might have remained our only antitrust statute and
antitrust policy might have had an unambiguous career as a guarantor of free mar-
kets." Id.
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borer on the other. Politically and economically, there was a grow-
ing sense that the old lines between the public and private needed
to be relaxed, and that presumptions about the evil of state inter-
vention needed to be thrown away. 157 The problem, as has been
said, was that the very nature of the new modem liberal style had
no answer for its own self-generated question about the role of the
courts. After the Sherman Act, should the Supreme Court read into
the act a legislative preference for abolishing all coercive restrictions
immanent in the law of property and contract? 158 Or did a more ap-
propriate route lie in the judicial analysis of competition and its
consequences, guided by the common law's commitment to "rea-
sonableness"?
B. THE CLASSIC LIBERAL STYLE: STANDARD OIL AND CHICAGO
BOARD OF TRADE
In 1911, the Supreme Court pushed into the majority what had
been in the previous couple decades a minority view about how to
interpret the Sherman Act. Should all agreements in restraint of
157 In terms of legal consciousness, the United States was in a very different head-
space. This is the time of laissez-faire Lochnerism. See HORWITZ, supra note 37. Her-
bert Hovenkamp has argued in this context that the early years of Sherman Act ju-
risprudence were a mix of waning and waxing aspects of classical and neoclassical
theories of competition. See Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of
Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1019 (1989).
158 Robert Lande has suggested that the ultimate goals of the Act were neither to
increase economic efficiency nor to address social concerns about the excess of indi-
vidualism. Lande, supra note 151, at 68. For Lande, the point of the Act was to
achieve a degree of distributive justice, where Congress "was concerned principally
with preventing unfair transfers of wealth from consumers to firms with market
power. Lande, supra note 151, at 68. Alan Meese, on the other hand, believes that the
Sherman Act was adopted neither as a response to political and social concerns with
laissez-faire, nor for reasons of economic efficiency or distributive justice. In his view,
antitrust law from its very beginnings had as its purpose the protection of contract
rights. Meese, supra note 151, at 10.
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trade be prohibited, 5 9 or only those agreements that were "unrea-
sonable" restraints? 160 The choice was clearly loaded with political
"' The case U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), represents the
"literalist" view of the Sherman Act. In that case, Justice Peckham wrote for the ma-
jority that the freight association's fixed rates violated the ideal of "free and unre-
stricted" competition. Id. For Peckham, the only way of determining a fair price was
through the competitive process itself, and the freight association was interfering
with that process. Id. No judge could say, on his own, what could possibly constitute
a reasonable price. Id.at 331-32. It was also out of the Judge's competence to say
whether the consequence of any particular act in the marketplace was reasonable. Id.
In dissent, Justice White emphasized the Sherman Act's appropriation of common
law language, and the rightness of using a reasonableness test for the meaning of
"competition." Id. at 343-74 (White, J., dissenting). Without recourse to a Rule of
Reason, White argued, contract and property rights would be subject to an over-
inclusive jurisprudence. Id. The freight association's rate decision, in this case, could
rightly be seen as a reasonable act, within the confines of the competitive process. In
his dissent, Justice White argued for a Rule of Reasonableness, and that a plain
meaning approach to the Act would defy all common sense. Id.
160 As Peritz explains, the Court's antitrust jurisprudence began to drift away from
Justice Peckham's view and towards Justice White's position in United States v. Joint
Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505 (1898), United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Company,
175 U.S. 211 (1899), and Northern Securities Company v. United States, 193 U.S. 197
(1904). PERITZ, supra note 136, at 316-24. In Addyston Pipe, Justice Peckham wrote for
the majority in a case involving several corporations engaged in the manufacture of
cast iron pipe, and which were charged with bid-rigging and price fixing in violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See generally U.S .v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 175 U.S.
211 (1899). In response to the claim that their agreements were in conformity with
common law practices, Peckham responded with a per se approach claiming that the
practices at issue was illegal because it literally represented a restraint on trade tend-
ing towards monopoly, and it didn't matter how reasonable the agreements might
have been. Id. In Northern Securities, a very controversial case, Justice Harlan wrote
the majority decision. N. Sec. Co. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197 (1904). Surveying a combina-
tion between competing railway lines, Harlan stated that the defendants railroad
companies had created a "combination in restraint of interstate and international com-
merce; and that is enough to bring it under the condemnation of the act. The mere
existence of such a combination, and the power acquired by the holding company as
its trustee, constitute a menace to, and a restraint upon, that freedom of commerce
which Congress intended to recognize and protect, and which the public is entitled
to have protected." Id. at 327. But was this enough? Recalling the debate over the
nascent Rule of Reason, Harlan asked, "Is the act to be construed as forbidding every
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the states or with
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implications: one worry was about the extent to which the Sherman
Act might be interpreted as being able to undermine the sanctity of
individual rights of property and contract, 161 and a chief means for
aligning what otherwise could have been a disastrous amount of
social engineering would be to ask, as a threshold matter, whether
we really wanted to scrutinize all contracts that posed real restraints
foreign nations? Or, does it embrace only such restraints as are unreasonable in their
nature?" Id. at 328. At this point, the answer was apparently easy: "It is sufficient to
say that from the decisions in the above cases certain propositions are plainly deduc-
ible and embrace the present case. Those propositions are: That although the act of
Congress known as the anti-trust act has no reference to the mere manufacture or
production of articles or commodities within the limits of the several states, it does
embrace and declare to be illegal every contract, combination, or conspiracy, in
whatever form, of whatever nature, and whoever may be parties to it, which directly
or necessarily operates in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or
with foreign nations; That the act is not limited to restraints of interstate and interna-
tional trade or commerce that are unreasonable in their nature, but embrac-
es all direct restraints imposed by any combination, conspiracy, or monopoly upon
such trade or commerce... That every combination or conspiracy which would extin-
guish competition between otherwise competing railroads engaged in interstate trade
or commerce, and which would in that way restrain such trade or commerce, is made
illegal by the act; That the natural effect of competition is to increase commerce, and
an agreement whose direct effect is to prevent this play of competition restrains in-
stead of promoting trade and commerce; That to vitiate a combination such as the act
of Congress condemns, it need not be shown that the combination, in fact, results or
will result, in a total suppression of trade or in a complete monopoly, but it is only
essential to show that, by its necessary operation, it tends to restrain interstate or
international trade or commerce or tends to create a monopoly in such trade or
commerce and to deprive the public of the advantages that flow from free competi-
tion ... No one, we assume, will deny that these propositions were distinctly an-
nounced in the former decisions of this court." Id. at 331-32.
161 This, of course, was hardly what judges in the early twentieth century were ea-
ger to do. As James May has said, judges of the time "commonly perceived them-
selves as guardians of a free political and economic order that naturally tended to
produce harmonious, just, and optimal results for both individuals and society at
large. State and federal jurists believed that this political and economic order was
potentially threatened by the rapid and profound changes of the era and sought to
meet this threat through continual, close scrutiny of public and private develop-
ments potentially subversive of the essential bases of American freedom and pros-
perity." May, supra note 151, at 258-59.
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on commerce. To view the Sherman Act is this light was to generate
a great deal of hostility with respect to freedom of contract and pri-
vate property rights, which in their essence are always about aliena-
tion. The view that would capture the majority and illustrate the
classic liberal style of antitrust enforcement would hold that only
unreasonable restraints would violate the Sherman Act.
162
But how would the court know an unreasonable agreement
from a reasonable one? According to the new majority, the analysis
would be guided by the lights of "the most elementary conceptions
of rights of property." 163 The exemplary cases are Standard Oil v.
United States 64 and Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States.165
162 As mentioned, it had been coming. The new view is also on display in Justice
Holmes' dissent in Northern Securities. N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. 197. Looking to the text
of the Sherman Act, Holmes was convinced that the most natural reading of the lan-
guage would militate in favor a more nuanced understanding of which kinds of
agreements were really the target of antitrust law. "If the statute applies to this case
it must be because the parties, or some of them, have formed, or because the North-
ern Securities Company is, a combination in restraint of trade among the states, or,
what comes to the same thing, in my opinion, because the defendants, or some or
one of them, are monopolizing, or attempting to monopolize, some part of the com-
merce between the states. But the mere reading of those words shows that they are
used in a limited and accurate sense. According to popular speech, every concern
monopolizes whatever business it does, and if that business is trade between two
states it monopolizes a part of the trade among the states. Of course, the statute does
not forbid that. It does not mean that all business must cease. A single railroad down
a narrow valley or through a mountain gorge monopolizes all the railroad transpor-
tation through that valley or gorge. Indeed, every railroad monopolizes, in a popular
sense, the trade of some area. Yet I suppose no one would say that the statute forbids
a combination of men into a corporation to build and run such a railroad between
the states." Id. at 406-07 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes also suggested that the
majority's view was hard to square with another early antitrust case, United States V.
E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Id. at 410.
16' N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 370. There is a large body of literature on the develop-
ment of the Rule of Reason. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST
ENTERPRISE (2005); Spencer Weber Waller, Justice Stevens and the Rule of Reason, 61
SMU L. REV. 693 (2009).
16 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
165 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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The problem at issue in Standard Oil was a concern that the
Rockefeller-owned trust had attained monopoly control over the oil
industry, enabling it to fix the price of crude and refined petroleum
products, and restrain all of its interstate commerce. 166 In its appli-
cation of the Sherman Act to the facts, the new majority led by Jus-
tice White began its analysis by plumbing English history for the
Act's common law heritage. 167 In contrast to the notion that the
Sherman Act was an instance of social planning, meant to tinker
with competition's constitutive rules of property and contract and
apiece with the modern liberal style, the Court instead articulated
some new, counter-modern guideposts:
1. That by the common law, monopolies were unlawful be-
cause of their restriction upon individual freedom of con-
tract and their injury to the public. 2. That as to necessaries
of life, the freedom of the individual to deal was restricted
where the nature and character of the dealing was such as
to engender the presumption of intent to bring about at
least one of the injuries which it was deemed would result
from monopoly,-that is, an undue enhancement of price. 3.
That to protect the freedom of contract of the individual,
not only in his own interest, but principally in the interest
of the common weal, a contract of an individual by which
he put an unreasonable restraint upon himself as to carry-
ing on his trade or business was void.16
166 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 32.
167 Id. at 51.
16 Id. at 54-55.
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The purpose of the Act, it turned out, was not to alter property
and contract at all. 169 Instead, antitrust law would have as its mis-
sion the adjustment of those contractual relations that tended to-
wards remedying the "evils" produced by concentrations of capital,
but letting alone the notion of concentration itself. The question be-
fore the Court was therefore whether Standard Oil's dominance of
the oil industry was reasonable in light of background conceptions of
property and contract.
170
Though the Court held that Standard Oil's actions had been un-
reasonable, and consequently illegal, the Standard Oil decision was
received as pro-business validation of monopoly capitalism. 171 After
all, what had clearly been dispensed with in the idea of a deep-
seated approach to "ruinous competition" was now replaced by a
Rule of Reason that appeared to validate, as a matter of its ground
rules, the very social condition causing so much protest. The politi-
cal effect was Congress' response with the establishment of the
Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission, and explicit legislative
reference to the problem of "competition," a word absent from the
Sherman Act.172 As for the states, twenty of them enacted antitrust
'69 Cf. Meese, supra note 151, at 7-15, for the view that Standard Oil was not an out-
lier and not the mark of a new approach at all. For Meese, Standard Oil continued a
respect for freedom of contract that had been implicit from the beginning. Id.
170 The Rule of Reason was further elaborated in cases like United States v. Trenton
Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927), which involved agreements among both individual and
corporate manufacturers of various pottery fixtures in households. In responding to
the defendants' claim that they should have been able to defend the practice on a
basis of reasonableness, the majority argued that the Rule of Reason was only appli-
cable in certain cases, and not to instances of blatant price-fixing like that found in
the present case. The distinctions continued, as illustrated in Appalachian Coals v.
United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), in which a unanimous court adopted the Rule of
Reason in its analysis of the coal industry.
i7 For opposing views, see PERITZ, supra note 136, and Meese, supra note 151, at 7-
15. 72 PERITZ, supra note 136, at 334.
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statutes over the next two years in the wake of the Court's Rule of
Reason test.173
The new Rule of Reason approach gained ground with Justice
Brandeis' famous decision in Chicago Board of Trade.174 At issue in
the case was a decision by members of the Chicago Board of Trade
to adopt the "call rule" with respect to grain markets in Chicago.
According to the rule as it was initially adopted, traders were not
allowed to buy or sell any grain at a price other than the last price at
the end of the day's session, until trading had resumed the next
day. Antitrust regulators argued that the call rule was a case of
price-fixing and illegal per se. The Board argued that the call's pur-
pose was not to restrict prices or control competition, but instead it
was an effort to break up a monopoly in the grain trade acquired by
a handful of members.
Justice Brandeis explained that the federal government's efforts
to enjoin the call rule were predicated on "the bald proposition, that
a rule or agreement by which men occupying positions of strength
in any branch of trade, fixed prices at which they would buy or sell
during an important part of the day, is an illegal restraint of
trade..." But this approach, Brandeis explained, made no sense. The
question for antitrust enforcement could not be whether an agree-
ment placed a restraint, since all agreements restrained trade in
some way. The better approach, which would become a standard
framework for thinking about the unreasonable restraint of trade,
would be to try to understand what effects the proposed regulation
would have on competition -is competition promoted or retarded?
173 Id.
174 Brandeis and Holmes were again in opposition when the Court decided Ameri-
can Column and Lumber v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). Going in the other direc-
tion was Maple Flooring Mfrs' Ass'n, 268 U.S. 563 (1925). Around the same time, U.S.
Steel was decided in favor of the defendant.
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The appropriate posture of the Court would be for it to take a
skeptical view of regulation, allowing it only to the extent that inter-
ference in the market could fairly be understood to actually have
pro-competitive effects. These effects could be identified by the
court through a functionalist jurisprudence fixed on particular facts,
the purpose of the restraint and the purpose of the activity in ques-
tion, and an understanding of as much context as possible. What
was critical for a court's evaluation of competitive markets was not
whether the state had determined it necessary to intervene -the
question for Brandeis was about identifying all the facts that might
help it "predict consequences." After applying the Rule of Reason
to the question of the call rule, the Brandeis court concluded that
the call rule was pro-competitive, and consequently dismissed the
federal effort to restrain the Board's decision.
Chicago Board of Trade is interesting in part because Justice
Brandeis was not after a crude defense of individual property and
contract rights. If Chicago Board of Trade merely followed Standard
Oil, it is not likely we would have seen the same kind of resort to a
fairly new instrumental approach like this. After all, in the style of
Standard Oil, there is little need for functionalism: property and con-
tract rights are perceived as largely unadulterated goods, and it is
unnecessary to ask whether they are good or less so in any particu-
lar context. Of course, that is not entirely what is happening in Chi-
cago Board of Trade either. What is subject to contextual analysis is
not the fair play of property and contract, but the appropriateness
of governmental interference with property and contract.
It is easy to situate Standard Oil and Chicago Board of Trade as
products of the Fuller Court's era of laissez-faire constitutionalism,
175
175 See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 62. See also James May, Antitrust in the
Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 50
OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 309 (1989) ("Both congressional and judicial analyses of early fed-
eral antitrust issues thus strongly reflected the same core perspectives of political
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and as Robert Bork put it, had Standard Oil not crashed against the
shores of modem liberalism, it might have entrenched antitrust law
as the "guarantor of free markets," and not as the regulator it would
become.176 As we have seen, the Court adopted a classic liberal style
of treating the Sherman Act as part of an effort to shield the com-
mon law from governmental intervention, and not, as some would
have preferred, to use the new antitrust law as a means for manipu-
lating the expanse of big business. Instead of using antitrust as a
weapon against concentration, per se, antitrust would focus instead
on unreasonable market effects.
It might be a little confusing, however, framing a period of
"classic liberal antitrust law." 17 After all, constitutional state action
doctrine in the classic liberal style would appear to be entirely at
odds with the very notion of antitrust law. In that context, law is
believed to have a central and constitutive relationship to market
growth: the private law rules of property and contract provide the
background rules for market competition, and without the protec-
tion of those rules, liberal markets do not happen. Thus, a classic
liberal idea about the constitution is that its central mission is to
ensure that state actors are prohibited from meddling in the free
play of those rules. Consequently, constitutional claims will be nul-
lified to the extent that they rely on acts taken in light of the private
law itself.
liberalism and classical economics that simultaneously played a fundamental role in
contemporary laissez-faire constitutionalism.").
176 BoRi, supra note 151, at 34.
177 Daniel Crane recognized the oddness of the question in Lochnerian Antitrust, 1
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 496, 496 (2005), where he asked, "Is there room for antitrust in
a Lochnerian world that strictly delimits the government's power to intervene in
private market transactions?" Crane's answer is unlike the one presented here, inso-
far as Crane was making a case for a confluence of interest between classic liberals
and antitrust lawyers.
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In the modern liberal style, in contrast, there is the sensibility
that constitutional protections are about quite a bit more than simp-
ly setting the ground rules of market competition. There is also a
belief that the ground rules are often unfair, and that as a result, it is
a mission of the state to intervene in the market on behalf of less-
advantaged actors. The question then emerges, if antitrust law is
emblematic of modern liberalism, how can there be a classic liberal
style of antitrust?
As the discussion above pointed out, there was substantial dis-
agreement both in Congress and the judiciary about just exactly
what the new antitrust law was really supposed to be doing. The
reason for its adoption, to be sure, was rooted in discontent with
classic liberal laissez-faire. But how much discontent? And discon-
tent with precisely what? These questions had been answered for
some time in the Court's minority opinions with a quite modest
view about governmental intervention in supposedly free mar-
kets- opinions which gained majority status in decisions like Stand-
ard Oil and Chicago Board of Trade. For present purposes, what this
signaled was (1) an antitrust law generally in deference to the un-
touchable character of the private law, and (2) the idea that when
regulation of the private law was considered at all, it would be con-
sidered with a skepticism about the state having a default privilege
to shape the market. Instead, the Court would adopt a Rule of Rea-
son for judicial determination about the correctness of regulation.
This is the sense in which antitrust law experienced a classic liberal
moment.
C. THE MODERN LIBERAL STYLE: PARKER AND SCHWEGMANN
BROTHERS
This Section introduces the use of foreground rules, now in the
style of modern liberalism, through a discussion of the antitrust
state action doctrine. The doctrine conventionally begins with Par-
ker, where the central question was whether an agricultural pro-
gram adopted by the California legislature violated the Sherman
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Act.178 The purpose of the program was to fix the prices of various
commodity sales in the state of California, and restrict competition
among producers, so as to "conserve the agricultural wealth of the
State" and to "prevent economic waste in the marketing of agricul-
tural products."179 In Parker, the appellee was a raisin producer and
purchaser claiming that the program's rules on raisin production,
and in particular the limitation on the actual amount of raisins a
producer was permitted to privately sell, violated federal antitrust
law. 180 The appellee claimed that he would be subject to the Cali-
fornia program's criminal penalties if he fulfilled his contractual
duties in the distribution of his 1940 (the year the program went
into effect) raisin crop.
81
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the state law by admit-
ting that if this had been a private ordering of contracts between
commercial producers, it would have violated the Sherman Act.
182
The Court was not long in elucidating the rationale for its conclu-
sion that this particular instance of anti-competitive behavior was
nevertheless a valid one: "[I]t is plain that the prorate program here
was never intended to operate by force of individual agreement or
combination. It derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative
command of the state and was not intended to operate or become ef-
fective without that command. We find nothing in the language of
the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose
17 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 344 (1943). The court also examined the legality
of the state program under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as
amended, 7 U. S. C. § 601, or the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
'7 Id. at 346.
t Id. at 349.
181 Id.
82 "We may assume for present purposes that the California prorate program
would violate the Sherman Act if it were organized and made effective solely by
virtue of a contract, combination or conspiracy of private persons, individual or cor-
porate." Id. at 350.
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was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities di-
rected by its legislature." 18 3 The critical point here is that the Court
definitively concludes that nothing in the text of the Sherman Act,
or in the Act's legislative history, can give a Court the warrant to
impede a legislature when its regulations appear anticompetitive. In
the classic liberal style, as we have seen, such a limitation on the
judiciary's authority over the legislature would have been heretical.
184
I 3 Id. at 350-51 (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court explained later in E. R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961): "Insofar as [the
Sherman] Act sets up a code of ethics at all, it is a code that condemns trade re-
straints, not political activity.... The proscriptions of the Act, tailored as they are for
the business world, are not at all appropriate for application in the political arena.
Congress has traditionally exercised extreme caution in legislating with respect to
problems relating to the conduct of political activities, a caution which has been re-
flected in the decisions of this Court interpreting such legislation." Id. at 140-41.
"' Parker can also be understood as an example of the break from classic to mod-
em in light of the Court's decision in Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927). The
dispute was over the practice of ticket resale in New York under New York statutes
that made the price of admission to theaters and similar venues a matter of "public
interest" and therefore subject to state supervision. In relevant part, the statute pro-
hibited the resale of tickets "at a price in excess of fifty cents in advance of the price
printed on the face of such ticket or other evidence of the right of entry." Id. at 427.
Writing for the majority, Justice Sutherland held the statute in violation of the Con-
stitution. "The authority to regulate the conduct of a business or to require a license,
comes from a branch of the police power which may be quite distinct from the power
to fix prices. The latter, ordinarily, does not exist in respect of merely private proper-
ty or business, but exists only where the business or the property involved has be-
come 'affected with a public interest."' Id. at 430 (citation omitted). Finding the "pub-
lic interest" to be a category of extraordinarily limited scope, the Court struck down
New York's attempt to regulate ticket resale through a price-fixing scheme. With
Holmes again in dissent, Tyson would eventually be explicitly overturned in Olsen v.
Nebraska ex rel. W Reference & Bond Ass'n, Inc., 313 U.S. 236 (1941). Justice Douglas,
writing for the majority, concluded: "In final analysis, the only constitutional prohi-
bitions or restraints which respondents have suggested for the invalidation of this
legislation are those notions of public policy embedded in earlier decisions of this
Court but which, as Mr. justice Holmes long admonished, should not be read into
the Constitution. Since they do not find expression in the Constitution, we cannot
give them continuing vitality as standards by which the constitutionality of the eco-
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This is not to suggest, however, that modern liberalism is simp-
ly the reverse of classic liberalism. On the one hand, the fact that the
Court interpreted the Act as only restraining private parties is a
clear thumb of the nose at the classic style. As it will be recalled, the
first job of classic regulation is to restrain the state itself from inter-
fering with the natural work of competition in the market. Though
antitrust law initially emerged through dissatisfaction with the clas-
sic style, decisions like Standard Oil rolled back the effect of the law
to do little more than attach a new set of statutory liabilities to a set
of very old common law claims. In the 1930s and '40s, the style
shifted again, and as seen here in Parker, restraining the state itself
appears far less vital than controlling the excess of private rights.
That is a modern move. Thus, when the Court stated that it found
nothing in the history of the Sherman Act debates to suggest that
anticompetitive acts on the part of the state were within its scope, it
explicitly rejected the view of the Court from prior decades that the
law had been intended to shield property and contract rights, period.
Consistent with the modern liberal style, the Parker court favored an
image of the controlling, planning, intervening state.
On the other hand, Parker illustrates a modem and quite power-
ful commitment to a distinction between private actors and political
society. As we have seen, this is the reverse of the modern liberal
style of constitutional state action doctrine, which is committed to a
very weak distinction between public and private. Yes, the goal of
antitrust law was to manage market performance, and yes, consum-
er protection and the defense of the small business owner were crit-
ical. But Parker's strong public-private distinction was not Shelley's
weak public-private distinction, and hardly moved the Court to-
wards a position where competition could be controlled through a
nomic and social programs of the states is to be determined." Id. at 246-47 (citations
omitted).
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diagnosis of its constitutive rules. Instead, Parker merely stood for
the proposition that when state actors adopt anticompetitive rules,
these rules will be assumed to be legitimate and free of a Rule of
Reason analysis, since in the modern liberal style courts will gener-
ally trust agencies to make such decisions.
Parker is not, to the contrary, instructing us that the private law
itself is immoral or coercive or anything itself. Parker was an in-
stance of controlling competition's consequences by way of distin-
guishing the freedom of private actors to make use of coercive re-
strictions granted them through the common law on the one hand,
and regulatory forms of power exercised by the California legisla-
ture on the other. Or, in other words, the antitrust state action doc-
trine as illustrated in Parker, is a doctrine about foreground rules. It
represents an argument for state power, not a critique of the mar-
ket's background rules. Indeed, this is what the modern liberal style
of controlling competition is all about. Thus, the constitutional and
antitrust state action doctrines represent reverse images of the pub-
lic-private distinction, but still within the language of the modern
liberal style.
Schwegmann Brothers. v. Calvert Distillers,18 5 decided eight years
later and penned by one of the authors of the so-called antitrust
makeover - William Douglas 86 - kept pace with Parker. 187 The ques-
' Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers, 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
116 See, e.g., C. Paul Rogers 1II, The Antitrust Legacy of Justice William 0. Douglas, 56
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 895 (2008).
187 A sister case to Parker, that precedes Schwegmann, is Federal Trade Commission v.
Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). At issue was whether a salt manufacturer can set
prices based upon quantity the retailer or wholesaler purchased. Because only the
largest companies could purchase carloads of salt, which would avail them of the
cheapest prices, the largest companies benefited from this arrangement. Additional-
ly, the manufacturers granted special allowances to favored customers-the largest
companies. Section 2 of the Clayton Act, which would have prevented this type of
price differentiation, was so weakened "as to render it inadequate, if not almost a
nullity." Id. at 43. To avoid this watering-down, Congress enacted the Robinson-
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tion was whether a Louisiana state law enabling manufacturers and
retailers to control resale prices and inoculating them from antitrust
suits also extended to third parties that were not parties to the anti-
competitive agreement. Central to the question was the 1937 Miller-
Tydings Act,188 a federal statute that allowed states to adopt laws
requiring retailers to adhere to resale prices stipulated by manufac-
turers -an activity that would otherwise be a violation of the Sher-
man Act. In Schwegmann, whiskey distributors from Maryland and
Delaware had entered into agreements with more than a hundred
sellers in Louisiana, providing that the retailers would not sell the
product at a price less than that determined by the distributors. The
petitioners were whiskey retailers based in Louisiana, who had re-
fused to sign the price-fixing agreement, and instead sold the re-
spondents' whiskey at a lower price, eventually prompting the suit.
The retailers' argument was that they could neither be bound by
any price-fixing contracts or the Miller-Tydings Act, since they were
Patman amendment to limit "the use of quantity price differential to the sphere of
actual cost differences. Otherwise ... such differentials would become instruments of
favor and privilege and weapons of competitive oppression." Id. at 43-44. "In enact-
ing the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress was especially concerned with protecting
small businesses which were unable to buy in quantities, such as the merchants here
who purchased in less-than-carload lots. To this end [Congress] undertook to
strengthen this very phase of the old Clayton Act." Id. at 49. The Robinson-Patman
Act, and the way it is construed by the Court, clearly reveals a modern liberal per-
spective. Instead of letting the market plays do as they want, and as dictated by the
market, the government is given the ability to protect particular features of the mar-
ket that they find desirable, small business. The classic liberal view would not pro-
tect small business for the sake of protecting small business or because it was benefi-
cial to society-arguably the more important reason for protecting small business.
Under the classical liberal style, the market would do what is best for society and
there would not be any reason to interfere for the benefit of society.
88 "That amendment provides in material part that 'nothing herein contained
shall render illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for the
resale' of specified commodities when 'contracts or agreements of that description
are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions' under local law." Schwegmann, 341
U.S. at 386 (1951).
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neither parties to any agreements and the Act did not purport to
extent federal control over the competitive decisions of third-
parties.
The Supreme Court first asked whether this kind of price-fixing
would be unlawful under the Sherman Act, which it easily an-
swered in the affirmative. 189 Price-fixing of this sort, the Court as-
sured, had been determined as a per se violation of the Sherman
Act. Next, the Court asked whether the Louisiana statute satisfied
the Miller-Tydings exemption to the Sherman Act, essentially legal-
izing the anticompetitive conduct of the whiskey distributors. The
Court found that the law allowed for contracts to restrict retailers
from re-selling except at the price stipulated by the vendor, and fur-
ther, it also condemned failures to abide by the price-fixing agree-
ments even when the retailers had not been parties to the con-
tract.190 Thus, the law allowed a distributor to effectively bring a
claim against any reseller for pricing at a discount.
Justice Douglas explained that the Louisiana statute failed to
conform to the Miller-Tydings Act.191 For one thing, Miller-Tydings
granted a limited immunity that was substantially expanded in the
Louisiana statute, which made it illegal for retailers to adjust the
price in any and all cases, even in regard to retailers that had never
entered into agreements with the distributors. If the Court were to
follow the respondents' lead and read into the Miller-Tydings Act
an intent to compel retailers to follow the bidding of manufacturers,
even in the absence of a price-fixing agreement, this would have
forced upon the Court a "distinct legislative function by reading
into the Act a provision that was meticulously omitted from it." 192
189 Id.
'90 Id. at 386-87.
191 Id.
'92 Id. at 388.
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What is important to note about Schwegmann Brothers is not
necessarily the result for the distributors, who failed to have their
way in forcing the petitioners to sell at the fixed price. It is rather
the implicit affirmation in 1951 of the Miller-Tydings Act itself,
which had been adopted in 1937 as a measure for granting states
more power to regulate their local markets and help small business
owners in the wake of the Depression. What is apparent in the case
is a belief in the appropriateness of regulators doing whatever they
need to do "to get the job done," including engaging in core in-
stances of "unfair" competition that would be clearly prohibited if
found in the private sphere. Neither a deep respect for property and
contract rights, nor a need to apply a court-centric Rule of Reason
analysis to determine the appropriateness of state action -both of
which are characteristic of the classic liberal style of antitrust en-
forcement-are apparent in the decision. Indeed, a year after
Schwegmann Brothers Congress built out Miller-Tydings with the
adoption of the McGuire Act, further expanding the permissibility
of resale price maintenance.
193
In the 1960s, antitrust state action cases evolved a separate but
related branch of law known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.194 In
the first half of this eponymous field, Eastern Railroad President Con-
ference v. Noerr Motor Freight195 involved a suit by individual truck-
ers and the Pennsylvania Motor Truck Association against an asso-
"' The prohibition on resale price maintenance was overruled in Leegin Creative
Leather Prods, Inc.. v. PSKS, 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
' The doctrine holds that private entities that attempt to influence government to
pass or enforce laws that would benefit them are not engaged in illegal antitrust
activity, even when the urged laws would have anticompetitive effects. Other cases
in the doctrine include Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Ind.,
508 U.S. 49 (1993); Columbia v Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. 365 (1991); FTC
v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n., 493 U.S. 411 (1990); Allied Tube & Conduit
Corp. v. Indian Head, 486 U.S. 492 (1988); Cal. Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Un-
limited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
'9' 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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ciation of railroad presidents for conspiring to retrain trade, mo-
nopolize the long-haul business, and ultimately destroy the truck-
ing industry. The truckers alleged that at the heart of the illegal
conduct was a public relations campaign "designed to foster the
adoption and retention of laws and law enforcement practices de-
structive of the trucking business." 196
Writing for the Court, Justice Black recalled the modern liberal
style of a public-private distinction: "the starting point for our con-
sideration of the case [is] that no violation of the [Sherman] Act can
be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or en-
forcement of laws." 197 The Court continued, "where a restraint upon
trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action,
as opposed to private action, no violation of the Act can be made
out." 198 For Justice Black, it was critical to keep in mind that the
Sherman Act was intended to regulate the private sphere, and not
shackle public actors themselves: "To hold that the government re-
tains the power to act in this representative capacity and yet hold, at
the same time, that the people cannot freely inform the government
of their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to
regulate, not business activity, but political activity, a purpose
which would have no basis whatever in the legislative history of
that Act." 199
Likewise in United Mine Workers v. Pennington,200 an independ-
ent coal operator complained that the union of mine workers and
several leading coal companies had conspired to encourage the Sec-
retary of Labor to establish minimum wages for coal miners, and
also to pressure the Tennessee Valley Authority to cease making
196 Id. at 129.
197 Id. at 135.
19' Id. at 136.
'99 Id. at 137.
200 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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purchases of coal that were not free from the requirements of the
Walsh-Healy Act. The upshot of all this was a concern that small
coal companies would get pushed out of the market, since they
were unable to compete with the higher minimum wage require-
ments offered by the big employers. After first resolving a question
about the nexus between labor law and antitrust law, 201 Justice
White explained in the majority opinion how Noerr had made clear
that antitrust laws were constrained by a substantial public-private
distinction. Nothing in the Sherman Act, Justice White argued,
made illegal any acts that were intended to participate in the politi-
cal process, even when those acts were animated by a clearly anti-
competitive purpose. "Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a con-
certed effort to influence public officials regardless of intent of pur-
pose." 2 2 In the case at hand, the smaller coal companies were
barred from a good claim under the Sherman Act, since "[j]oint ef-
forts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws
even though intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not
illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself
violative of the Sherman Act."
203
The modern liberalism of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is sub-
tle but important to highlight. As Rudolph Peritz has argued, the
court began with an explicit commitment to a formal distinction
between political (public) and economic (private) spheres. "There
was no Rule of Reason, no balancing, just two spheres and two con-
clusions." 20 4 For Peritz, the cases are consequently a kind of glimpse
into the neoformalism that would emerge towards the end of the
20th century.205 In these and other cases, 20 6 Peritz sees the use of a
201 Id. at 664-66.
202 Id. at 670.
203 Id.
204 PERITZ, supra note 136, at 207.
201 Id. at 209.
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"marketplace of ideas" in which political actors must remain un-
constrained in their capacity to affect the political process. Thus, the
Court shies away from a Rule of Reason approach since to do so
would impermissibly bring a consequentialist analysis to a deonto-
logical question about the fundamental right of citizens to make
political choices. Peritz does not frame his critique this way, but it
sounds like he is pushing the Noerr-Pennington cases out of the
modern liberal style, and into what Duncan Kennedy would call
contemporary legal thought.
20 7
One consequence of the insight into the connection between the
two state action doctrines, as has already been stated, is that within
the modern liberal style it is possible to see diverging uses of the
public-private distinction. In the modern style of constitutional state
action doctrine, the public-private distinction is weakened in an
effort to make space for the more aggressive use of foreground rules
in the regulation of the market. In contrast, the modern liberal style
of antitrust state action doctrine seeks the very same goal but
through the use of a strong public-private distinction: private actors
are held to a very different standard of competitive engagement
than are public actors. In the context of Noerr-Pennington, these cas-
es can be read as safely in line with the modem liberal style of anti-
trust state action cases: a strong public-private distinction is used in
the service of inoculating public actors from the constraints of the
Sherman Act.208
206 See, e.g., Am. Comrnc'n Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Giboney v. Empire
Storage, 336 US 490 (1949); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
207 Kennedy, supra note 61.
208 It doesn't seem to me that the stakes are very high in being able to say anything
definitively about whether these cases are, to use Kennedy's terminology, better
suited to social legal consciousness than contemporary legal consciousness. My only
interest is to show that within modem liberalism (or social legal consciousness) it is
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D. THE NEOLIBERAL STYLE: GOLDFARB, CANTOR, AND MIDCAL
As will be recalled, constitutional state action doctrine took a
wild turn in 1978, riding the neoliberal bandwagon back towards
the notion that the Constitution's primarily competitive effect was
to insure the free market against unwanted state intervention. Wit-
nessing a similar turn in the domain of competition law's fore-
ground rules, Eleanor Fox wrote in 1980 that "antitrust law is in
search of a new equilibrium. It is torn between claims that it should
limit the power of large corporations and claims that it should in-
crease the efficiency of American business. Regard for efficiency is
in the ascendancy."
209
As far as state action went, the Supreme Court gradually gener-
ated a legal conception of the market that was less willing to allow
the state to engage in apparently anticompetitive behavior: the
modern liberal use of a strong public-private distinction, where pri-
vate actors were forbidden to do what public actors were allowed to
do, was in deep decline. The shift here, however, was not from a
strong public-private distinction to a weak one-it was rather to a
different but similarly powerful one. While the shift in style was not
as dramatic here as it was in the context of constitutional state ac-
tion doctrine, it happened nonetheless. The most significant shift
after Parker came in the 1980 decision in Midcal. Before getting to
Midcal, however, we might review a couple forerunners to the
emerging neoliberal style.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,210 the plaintiffs brought a claim
over what appeared to be price-fixing agreements between local
attorneys, the county bar association, and the state bar association,
possible to be in favor of the market's foreground rules either through the use of
weak or strong forms of a public-private distinction.
209 Fox, Modernization, supra note 151, at 1140.
210 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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and the Supreme Court had little difficulty pegging it as a state-
sanctioned price-fixing scheme. The Court admitted that the state
did have a cognizable interest in regulating lawyers and the legal
profession, but whereas this interest might have been sufficient in a
different style, the Court was unimpressed in 1975. The question for
the Court was whether the state bar association, working under the
authority of the Virginia Supreme Court, represented the kind of
"sovereign activity" required by Parker. For Burger, the connection
between the bar association, the Virginia Supreme Court, and "real"
acts of state was simply too attenuated. "In our view that is not
state action for Sherman Act purposes. It is not enough that, as the
County Bar puts it, anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state
action; rather, anticompetitive activities must be compelled by di-
rection of the State acting as a sovereign." 211 The fact that the state
bar was a state agency, and that the Virginia Supreme Court was,
well, the Supreme Court of Virginia, just did not represent enough
of the "state" to trigger immunity for blatantly anticompetitive ac-
tion. Parker did not yet receive a makeover, but the Burger Court
was certainly sending less generous signals about an allowance of
heavy foreground rules.
A year later, the Court decided Cantor v. Detroit Edison Compa-
ny.212 The facts involved a mandate by the Michigan Public Service
Commission regarding the provision of free light bulbs to Michigan
residents. Though customers surely enjoyed the practice, retailers
did not, and eventually a drug store brought an antitrust suit claim-
ing unfair competition in the sale of the bulbs. Lower courts fol-
lowed Parker, and found that the giving away of free light bulbs by
utility companies was an exempted restraint on trade since the
Commission was a state agency. As the Supreme Court noted, "A
211 Id. at 791.
212 Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
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Michigan statute vests the Commission with "complete power and
jurisdiction to regulate all public utilities in the state ... [The stat-
ute confers express power on the Commission] to regulate all rates,
fares, fees, charges, services, rules, conditions of service, and all
other matters pertaining to the formation, operation, or direction of
such public utilities."
213
Like in Goldfarb, the Court in Cantor was not quite ready to do
too much to the state action doctrine, though the Court's trajectory
was clear enough. Reviewing the very "narrow" holding in Parker,
Justice Stevens explained that "the term state action may be used
broadly to encompass individual action supported to some extent
by state law or custom. Such a broad use of the term, which is famil-
iar in civil rights litigation, is not, however, what Mr. Chief Justice
Stone described in his Parker opinion. He carefully selected lan-
guage which plainly limited the Court's holding to official action
taken by state officials." 214 In the end, the Court concluded that
while there was admittedly a state action element in the case, the
sort of unambiguous effort by the state to regulate an area of the
private sphere was lacking. There was too much blending of public
and private initiative, and too much discretion for utilities to at once
obey the Commission's mandate and still abide by the antitrust
laws. 215
The gradual pressure being exerted on the modern liberal style
pushed forward a couple years later in California Retail Liquor Deal-
er's Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 216 Though not as visible in its ret-
213 Id. at 584.
214 Id. at 590-91.
215 Id. at 610. The dissent rightfully points out that the 'narrow' scope of the Parker
opinion is new interpretation of it. Id. at 622 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
216 See also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 362 (1977) (holding that state
rules against lawyer advertisements were immune from the Sherman Act because
the rules articulated the state's policy with regard to professional behavior); Massa-
chusetts Sch. of Law at Andover v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir. 1997) (hold-
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ro flourishes as Flagg Brothers, Midcal undermined the Parker pre-
sumption that there existed a broadly legitimate field of state action
that would be regarded as different in kind from similarly "anti-
competitive" acts of private parties.
The problem in Midcal was that the California Business and
Professions Code 217 required wine producers, wholesalers, and rec-
tifiers to file fair trade contracts and price schedules with the state,
and to sell wine only in accordance with those schedules. 218 To do
otherwise, a wine merchant would have faced the revocation or
suspension of her liquor license. 219 Subsequently, California's de-
partment of Alcohol Beverage Control brought an action against
Midcal Aluminum for selling wine at prices less than that mandated
in the pricing schedules, and Midcal argued in response that the
Code forced upon California's residents a commitment to "resale
price maintenance," a practice conventionally understood to violate
the Sherman Act.220 As in Parker, the Court agreed that California's
scheme was anticompetitive, and that in the hands of the market,
such a plan would be easily condemned.221 Now, a court operating
in the modern liberal style would not necessarily immunize Cali-
fornia due to its presumed discretion to control its regional market.
Modern liberalism tells us nothing about how to decide, only what
language to speak.
Thus, Midcal could have continued in the modern style if it had
foregrounded the necessity of state intervention. But it did not. In-
ing the ABA to be immune from antitrust liability on the rationale that the ABA's
law school accreditation decisions would not affect state bar admission requirements
in the absence of state involvement).
217 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 24866, 24862.





221 Id. at 103.
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stead, the Court articulated a test to be used in determining wheth-
er the dispute in question was really a result of private or public
law rules. The Court explained, "First, the challenged restraint must
be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state poli-
cy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State
itself."222 In its application of this test, the Court found that though
California's rule had been clearly articulated, it had not been guid-
ed by a sufficient degree of state action -California enforced the
rule, to be sure, but it had no direct involvement in the actual set-
ting of the schedules. This absence of "active supervision" on the
part of the state disclosed the true nature of the program: "a private
price-fixing arrangement." 2 3 The upshot was a shift from an implic-
it Parker presumption in favor imagining the state as planning com-
petition, to an image of the state as a potential wrench in the com-
petitive works, and a "test" for determining when it had been just
that.
After Midcal the Court continued to develop a neoliberal ap-
proach in Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Labs.224 At
issue was whether the sale of pharmaceutical drugs to govern-
ments, which would end up back in the commerce stream and in
competition with private retailers, was anticompetitive behavior.
The petitioner was a retail pharmacist who sued pharmaceutical
manufacturers and the University of Alabama, which was operating
222 Id. at 105.
223 Id. at 106.
224 460 U.S. 150 (1983). Peritz argues that the Court imagines that there is "some
sort of preexisting 'market' whose commercial nature turns all participants, short of
entire states, into 'economic' actors - that is, subject to the antitrust laws .... [In
Jefferson County] the Court imagined 'the private retail market' that 'a State has chosen
to compete in."' PERITZ, supra note 136, at 275. Peritz's purpose is similar to ours, but
differs in one regard. He imagines that all action is political and that by framing
some issues as "economic" and not political allows some separation. Here, we are
focusing not on political/economic, but on private/public.
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two pharmacies. The defendants claimed, and the lower courts
agreed, that they were protected by a state action immunity de-
fense.
Lower courts held that the Robinson-Patman Act exempted all
state purchases. 225 The Supreme Court found that the issue was nar-
rower than lower courts had believed: "we are not concerned with
sales to the Federal Government, nor with state purchases for use in
traditional governmental functions. Rather, the issue before us is
limited to state purchases for the purpose of competing against pri-
vate enterprise - with the advantage of discriminatory prices - in
the retail market." 226 As we have now repeatedly seen, the Court
once again engaged in a narrowing tactic about what is and is not
state action, and what are legitimately understood as "traditional
governmental functions,"227
Around the same time as Midcal, the Supreme Court began ex-
amining the antitrust state action doctrine in the context of cities
and municipalities. 2m Starting in 1979, the Supreme Court began
225 Jefferson County, 460 U.S. at 154.
226 Id. at 153-54.
227 The first move is for the Court to examine the legislative history: "the Legisla-
tive history falls far short of supporting respondents' contention that there is an ex-
emption for state sales of 'commodities' for 'resale.' There is nothing whatever in the
Senate or House Committee Reports, the floor debates, focusing on the issue." Id. at
159. The Court disposes of the possibility that the Robinson-Patman Act exempted
this type of state action by invoking the absence of any language supporting this
type of action. The Court then states there is no judicial precedence allowing it either.
Id. at 166-70. Then the Court shows its hand: "The Robinson-Patman Act has been
widely criticized, both for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to pro-
mote.. .The legislative history is replete with references to the economic evil of large
organizations purchasing from other large organizations for resale in competition
with the small local retailers. There is no reason in the absence of an explicit exemp-
tion, to think that Congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny small busi-
nesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson County, Alabama, protection from the
competition for the strongest competitor of them all." Id. at 170-71.
228 The original Parker opinion exempts state action that are the official actions of
governments that are acts of "the state or it's municipalities." 317 U.S. at 351-52.
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constraining the ability of cities and municipalities to engage in
price-fixing in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co.229
Since this opinion came several years after Goldfarb the Court was
able to formalistically apply the rule created there, to find that the
municipal action was not exempt from federal antitrust action be-
cause they are not sovereign. 230 Exemption must depend upon
whether the state authorized the municipality to operate as it did or
whether it "contemplated the kind of action complained of."23 1 Re-
quiring the state to authorize or contemplate a specific action to al-
low a city or municipality to benefit from the state action exemption
was further refined in 1985. In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,23
2
the Court held that the state does not need to supervise a city or
municipality so they can be availed of the exemption, but there
However, some contend that "it is clear, when the opinion is taken as a whole, that
the Court intended to limit the Parker exemption to one specific category of govern-
mental actors - states..." John T. Delacourt & Todd Zywicki, The FTC and State Ac-
tion: Evolving Views on the Proper Role of Government, 6 (George Mason University
School of Law, Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 23, 2005).
229 City of Lafayette, La. v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
230 Another example of a formalistic application of a rule that constrains
city/municipal ability is Cmty. Commc'n Co. v. City ofBoulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). Un-
like Lafayette, the Boulder opinion is unique in that Boulder is a home rule city, which
means that in this jurisdictions the laws of the city are supreme to the state even
when they conflict with the state. Boulder's anticompetitive cable ordinance prevent-
ed an incumbent from expanding their operations and this was found to illegal as
against competition. The question should have been asked as to whether in a home
rule city, the city operates as a sovereign or not. However, the court assumes away
any consideration of the question: ""The ordinance cannot be exempt from such
scrutiny unless it constitutes either the action of the State itself in its sovereign capac-
ity or municipal action in furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy. The Parker "state action" exemption reflects
Congress' intention to embody in the Sherman Act the federalism principle that the
States possess a significant measure of sovereignty under the Federal Constitution.
But this principle is inherently limited: ours is a "dual system of government" which
has no place for sovereign cities." Id. at 40-41.
23 Id. at 413.
232 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
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must be a clear, articulated policy to replace competition with regu-
lation. This would be satisfied when the state "has delegated to the
cities the express authority to take action that foreseeably will result
in anticompetitive effects."
233
Just as with constitutional state action doctrine, the neoliberal
revival did not come to achieve a dominant position in the competi-
tion among the styles of liberal legalism. 234 Modern liberal ap-
proaches would continue alongside the neoliberal style, weaving an
eclectic pattern of decisions at once favorable to the idea of the state
as social planner, and guarded against the inevitable tendency for
governmental intervention to abuse the Rule of Law.
233 Id. at 43. Contrary to not requiring state supervision, the Court held in S. Carri-
ers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985) that if a state has a policy to
permit the anticompetitive activity and it supervises, then a private party seeking to
benefit from the exemption does not need to be acting pursuant to the direction of
the state. See also Ticor Title Ins., infra note 235, at 172.
234 Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986) (a restraint imposed unilaterally
by government does not become concerted action needed before it can be character-
ized as in violation of the Sherman Act simply because it has a coercive effect); Fed.
Trade Comm'n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. 504 U.S. 621 (1992) (the court applied the
Midcal two-part test for state action and held (for the first time) that the private firms
had not been regulated adequately under a clearly articulated legislative policy, and
were not protected by state action immunity); Snake River Valley Elec. Ass'n v.
Pacificorp, 238 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding in favor of state action immunity);
Trigen Oklahoma City Energy Corp. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 244 F.3d 1220
(10th Cir. 2001) (finding in favor of state action immunity); Elec. Inspectors, Inc. v.
Village of East Hills, 320 F.3d 110 (2d. Cir. 2003) (finding in favor of state action im-
munity); Arroyo-Melecio v. Puerto Rican Am. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2005)
(finding against state action immunity); Mothershed v. Justices of Supreme Court,
410 F.3d 602 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding against state action immunity); Sanders v.
Brown, 504 F.3d 903 (2007) (finding in favor of state action immunity); Lafaro v. New
York Cardiothoracic Grp, PLLC, 570 F.3d 471 (2009) (finding in favor of state action
immunity).
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E. SUMMARY
This Part discussed the antitrust state action doctrine in its
modern and neoliberal styles, as well as an initial classic liberal idea
about antitrust law. As mentioned, the very notion of classic liberal
antitrust is a little odd, if we take antitrust law to itself be emblem-
atic of a liberal commitment to the use of foreground rules in the
regulation of market society. Nevertheless, it makes sense to see the
early years of antitrust jurisprudence (and perhaps the neoliberal
phase as well) in exactly this way. The truth is, antitrust law has
always been subject to disagreement about its essential function: is it
just the continuation of the common law by other means, or state-
led regulation? To the extent we see it as the former, antitrust law is
surely a mode of jurisprudence more in the spirit of a classic liberal
focus on background rules. When we see it as the latter, we are see-
ing it in the modern liberal style.
Once the discussion turned to the emergence of antitrust state
action doctrine in Parker, the argument developed two points. One
was to show how the two state action doctrines share a common
grammar. In this particular context, that grammar is about the legal
construction and maintenance of liberal markets, where the one
doctrine is focused on background rules while the other addresses
rules in the foreground. Taken together, and when viewed in light
of liberal legalism, the two doctrines provide a comprehensive and
coherent simulacrum of US competition law. To look at one set of
rules while ignoring the other is to see only a part of the story about
how law both constitutes and regulates markets.
The other point was more focused specifically on the nature of
the public-private distinction and its relation to liberal legalism. The
well-known history of the public-private distinction is the history
we have seen in the context of constitutional law. It begins strong,
falters, and comes back fighting. The story in the context of fore-
ground rules is different. In the classic liberal style of antitrust, we
see the same public-private distinction at work: private individuals
exercising property and contract rights in an autonomous sphere,
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and a public sphere of artificial, arbitrary political power. But the
modem liberal version of the distinction was different here-
instead of the weakening we saw in Shelley, antitrust state action
doctrine retained a strong form of the public-private distinction,
though it was cast in a very different light. In this context, private
actors were subjected to a new and aggressive style of regulation.
The free play of property and contract could be seen as destructive
and even immoral, and what was needed was a heavier managerial
hand in the maintenance of the market. These new constraints on
what was deemed appropriately "competitive" behavior, however,
were not applicable in the public sphere. Whereas in the classic lib-
eral style, it was pivotal to prohibit the state from mucking around
in the market, in the modern liberal style it was the individual (per-
son or corporation) that was prohibited from mucking around. The
public-private distinction was functioning powerfully in both in-
stances- it had just flipped.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued on behalf of a liberal distinction be-
tween competition law and antitrust law. The former consists in the
legal structure of a market society, while the latter involves, at least
in the United States, those judicial constructions of the Sherman Act
and other related statutory regimes. In this sense, competition law
is comprised of a broad language of ostensibly disparate legal
dialetcs- it is the wide-ranging structure that enables and regulates
transactions under the rubric of "free competition." That is, the very
idea of free competition, in the liberal sense of the phrase, requires a
legal framework, and that framework involves a great deal more
than antitrust law.
In the terminology of this Article, the rules of antitrust were de-
scribed as some of the market's foreground rules-rules that are
responsive, regulatory, and managerial. They are utilized in an ef-
fort to control a pre-existing activity. Background rules, in contrast,
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are those rules that constitute an activity, and bring it into being. In
the classic liberal style of making a market, property rights and
freedom of contract are essential background rules. To the extent
that the constitutional state action doctrine has been used as an ar-
gument about the degree to which the deployment of those back-
ground rules are acts of state, it is a doctrine that is deeply implicat-
ed in the liberal legal structure of market society.
Indeed, as this Article has argued, it is in the broader context of
liberal legalism and its use of background and foreground rules that
we are able to see how seemingly disconnected fields of law are
actually united. As mentioned at the beginning, the argument here
is not that the traditional readings of the CSAD and ASAD have
been wrong. It is rather that in having been determined to look at
the two state action doctrines in isolation, we have failed to reap the
benefits of seeing them together.
